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ALTERNATIVES TO MAINSTREAM ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: ELIMINATING FORCED ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT
Anne Marie Lofaso* & Ashley M. Stephens**
Abstract
Today, many employers require their employees, as a condition of
employment, to agree to arbitrate employment-related legal claims rather
than pursue them in court. While arbitration can be mutually beneficial,
allowing parties to avoid the cost, time, publicity, and unpredictability
associated with traditional litigation, mandatory arbitration often lacks
the same procedural safeguards afforded by the justice system. Forced
arbitration not only deprives employees of their right to sue their employer
in a public court, but it also denies them any meaningful voluntary choice
to surrender that right. This Article takes a close look at a variety of
workplace grievance procedures with a particular focus on peer-centered
processes. This Article then argues that preserving employee choice to
pursue litigation or internal dispute resolution with peer advocacy
remains the most effective way to promote fairness and justice for
employees. Finally, this Article suggests several workable alternatives to
mandatory arbitration that are cost-effective and advantageous to
employees and employers alike.
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INTRODUCTION
Conflict is an unavoidable part of being human, and workplace conflict is
ubiquitous.1 From mild gripes about work assignments to more egregious clashes
1

See Workplace Conflict Statistics, POLLACK PEACEBUILDING SYS.,
https://pollackpeacebuilding.com/workplace-conflict-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/DFF5872Z] (last visited June 25, 2022) (summarizing workplace conflict data from government
and academic sources through 2018). See Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY
1997 Through FY 2021, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/statist
ics/charge-statistics-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-1997-through-fy-2021 [https://perma.cc/2PQQ6UDC] (last visited June 25, 2022). According to the EEOC, employees filed 61,331 charges
alleging workplace discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, religion, color,
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involving sexual harassment, racial bullying, or vaccine mandates, workplace
disputes can create negative consequences for both employers and employees.
Failure to address workplace conflict in a fair, equitable, and timely manner can
affect employee morale and hinder performance, both of which can negatively
impact an employer’s reputation and revenues.
As litigation costs increase, both public and private employers have turned to
internal grievance mechanisms as an alternative, and less expensive, source of
conflict resolution.2 Pre-dispute arbitration agreements have become increasingly
popular in both unionized and non-unionized workplaces.3 Today, many companies
rely on forced arbitration clauses, making arbitration mandatory to resolve disputes.4
One recent study found that as many as 80 of the largest 100 American companies
use arbitration agreements to resolve workplace disputes, most of which are
mandatory and 39 of which contain class action waivers.5 Another study of
predominantly Fortune 100 companies found that 92.9 percent of employment
contracts sampled, which contained mandatory arbitration agreements, also waived
the worker’s right to a jury trial.6 According to a study published by the Economic
Policy Institute, the number of workers subjected to mandatory arbitration rose from
just over 2 percent in 1992 to more than 55 percent by the year 2018.7 The study
also shows that 23.1 percent of private sector, non-union employees, or nearly 24.5
million American workers, have waived their right to bring a class action claim.8

retaliation, age, disability, pay, and genetic disclosure. These charges are, however, down
from a recent high of nearly 100,000 charges in both 2011 and 2022. Id.
2
See David Lewin, Grievance Procedures in Non-union Workplaces: An Empirical
Analysis of Usage, Dynamics, and Outcome, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 823, 824–25 (1990);
DAVID W. EWING, JUSTICE ON THE JOB: RESOLVING GRIEVANCES IN THE NONUNION
WORKPLACE 7–8, 32 (1989).
3
Cf. A Predispute Arbitration Clause—Arbitration Agreement Explained, ADR TIMES
(Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.adrtimes.com/predispute-arbitration-clause/ [https://perma.cc/
6436-B72K].
4
See Genevieve Carlton, Forced Arbitration Agreements, WORKING: NOW AND THEN
(June 1, 2018), https://www.workingnowandthen.com/blog/forced-arbitration-agreements/
[https://perma.cc/6ZZP-C8NV].
5
Imre S. Szalai, Institute Report Indicates Widespread Use of Workplace Arbitration,
NAT’L INST. FOR WORKERS’ RTS., http://employeerightsadvocacy.org/publications/widespre
ad-use-of-workplace-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/VJ8A-LP55] (last visited June 25, 2022).
6
See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Mandatory Arbitration
for Customers but Not for Peers: A Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 92 JUDICATURE 118, 122 (2008) (noting also that these same companies
favored jury trials in business-to-business disputes.).
7
ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION 1, 2, 5
(2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/144131.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8FK-MGFJ].
8
Id. at 11.
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The coercive nature of forced arbitration agreements makes them dangerously
unfair to workers.9 Rather than having their rights adjudicated by juries of their
peers, American workers often must bring claims—which are based on statutes
enacted by Congress or state legislatures—through arbitral forums designated by
agreements that their own employers drafted and required them to agree to as a
condition of employment.10 Thus, employees who sign forced arbitration agreements
are compelled to make an untenable choice: give up their civil rights or give up their
job.11 This dynamic is the direct result of a dramatic shift in how the employment
rights of American workers are enforced.
While arbitration agreements are not inherently immoral, access to justice in
employment has become fragmented and enormously one-sided. For example,
studies have shown that employees are not only less likely to pursue discrimination
cases in arbitration,12 they are also far less likely to succeed even when they do.13
Moreover, monetary awards are usually far lower for employees who manage to
obtain a successful outcome in arbitration than they would be in court.14 While
arbitration can be more efficient and less costly than litigation in many cases, it lacks
the same procedural safeguards provided by a court of law.15 Arbitration is not
uniform among companies; rather, “arbitration” is used to describe a variety of
dispute resolution procedures that employers can implement in almost any manner
they choose.16 For instance, “arbitration may not provide parties with the same extent
of discovery that a court would,”17 and it does not always permit access to evidence
held by the other side that can substantiate a party’s claims.18 The lack of evidentiary
safeguards is particularly concerning in discrimination claims, which often hinge on
knowing how the employer has treated other employees.19 Moreover, arbitrators
9

See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of
Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 300–08 (2004) (discussing the lack of
accountability, transparency, rationality, substantive equal treatment, and personal autonomy
of mandatory arbitration and characterizing arbitration as “coerced”).
10
Arbitration at Work, LEGAL AID AT WORK, https://legalaidatwork.org/factsheet/arbit
ration-at-work/ [https://perma.cc/C25S-XQBF] (last visited June 25, 2022).
11
See id. (explaining that the employee must arbitrate employment disputes unless the
agreement is deemed unconscionable).
12
Cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV.
679, 698–89 (2018).
13
KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC:
MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS 19
(2015), https://files.epi.org/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY3J-YNKT].
14
Id.
15
See id. at 18, 4–5.
16
See id. at 5.
17
Id. at 3–4.
18
See R.W. Fleming, Some Problems of Evidence Before the Labor Arbitrator, 60
MICH. L. REV. 134, 139–44 (1961).
19
See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived” and Lost
in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOY. L. J. 381, 416 n.226 (1996) (noting
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may or may not be well versed in labor and employment law, and they may or may
not be trained in resolving disputes.20 The outcome of arbitration is binding, and
there is typically no right to appeal.21 The outcome is also kept secret, which enables
companies to evade public accountability.22 Many of these drawbacks are notably
present in the sexual harassment context. While the voices of sexual harassment
victims are finally being heard, thanks to the #MeToo movement, they are often
silenced by mandatory arbitration agreements.23
Mandatory arbitration agreements have recently come under fire, in part
because of the spotlight placed on its downsides by the #MeToo movement. For
instance, Microsoft became the first Fortune 500 company to announce that it would
eliminate mandatory arbitration agreements for workplace sexual harassment
disputes and also endorsed bipartisan legislation to end arbitration of sexual
harassment claims.24 Similarly, on March 3, 2022, President Joe Biden signed an
anti-arbitration agreement bill into law.25 This Act amends the Federal Arbitration
Act to provide individuals asserting sexual assault or sexual harassment claims the
option to adjudicate those claims in court even if they had agreed to arbitrate such
arbitrations in which no racial animus was found since the employer treated the employee
similar to other employees).
20
Cf. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 13, at 5 (“[T]he arbitrator can be any person the
parties have designated . . . .”).
21
Id. at 3.
22
See Ashlee E. Hamilton, Arbitration Award Ruled a Non-Confidential Judicial
Record, ABA (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/
litigation-news/top-stories/2021/arbitration-award-ruled-non-confidential-judicial-record/
[https://perma.cc/A9L4-6ABZ]; cf. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 13, at 15 (discussing the
lack of public transparency in arbitration).
23
See Matthew DeLange, Note, Arbitration or Abrogation: Title VII Sexual
Harassment Claims Should Not Be Subjected to Arbitration Proceedings, 23 J. GENDER,
RACE & JUST. 228, 230 (2020) (“Arbitration is an inappropriate venue for sexual harassment
claims because impermissible sexual conduct occupies a unique place in society and deserves
special consideration, [and] the lack of accountability and transparency associated with
arbitration, compared to federal litigation, ineffectively vindicates Title VII sexual
harassment rights.”).
24
See Brad Smith, Microsoft Endorses Senate Bill to Address Sexual Harassment,
MICROSOFT BLOGS (Dec. 19, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/
microsoft-endorses-senate-bill-address-sexual-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/C62E-SUX8]
(noting, as the President and Vice-Chair of Microsoft, that Microsoft supports legislation
introduced by Senators Kirsten Gillibrand and Lindsey Graham to end forced arbitration for
sexual harassment claims and that Microsoft would waive its own policy for such claims);
Sara Ashley O’Brien, Microsoft Lifts Policy that Silences Sexual Harassment Claims, CNN
(Dec. 19, 2017, 1:57 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/19/technology/microsoft-endsforced-arbitration/index.html?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/ME3S-AHFG]. The GillibrandGraham Bill was reintroduced most recently as the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual
Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, as Senate Bill 2342 and supported by House
Bill, H.R. 4445. See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment
Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-90, 136 Stat. 26 (2022).
25
Id.
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disputes before those claims arose.26 Yet, as this Act only applies to sexual
harassment claims, for every other kind of workplace grievance, an arbitration
agreement would still likely govern.
This Article examines workplace grievance procedures with an eye toward
developing fair and accessible mechanisms for dispute resolution without
threatening essential employee rights and attaining employer support. This Article
explores alternative mechanisms for increasing access to workplace justice,
including litigation, peer advocacy and peer review panels, and voluntary arbitration
agreements. It argues that, given the current legal climate, preserving employee
choice to pursue litigation or internal dispute resolution with peer advocacy remains
the most effective way to promote justice for employees.
The Article proceeds in the following four parts. Part I presents a historical
account of how U.S. workplace law shifted from a near absolute at-will situation to
one where employers increasingly favor forced arbitration and briefly introduces the
reader to the enormous costs associated with workplace conflict. Part II analyzes the
pros and cons of formal litigation and informal internal dispute resolution in both
union and nonunion workplaces. Part III explores how companies such as the
Polaroid Corporation developed and used peer advocacy programs as a successful
method of reducing workplace conflict. Part III also briefly assesses peer advocacy
against other forms of conflict resolution to highlight the innovative thinking behind
the peer review program. Part IV examines three viable solutions to the workplace
justice problem: trading mandatory arbitration for just cause dismissal, extending
Weingarten rights—the right to peer representation—to nonunion arbitration, and
voluntary arbitration that preserves judicial remedies. Part IV also presents the legal
argument for how to structure peer review to avoid labor law violations and
concludes with suggestions about how the law should and should not regulate
workplace disputes with observations about pending federal legislation designed to
outlaw unilateral forced-arbitration clauses.
I. HISTORY OF WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE U.S.
In the United States, employment-at-will is the default job-security legal rule.27
The default rule can be expressed in terms of the duties it imposes and the rights it
creates.28 According to the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer may lawfully

26

Id.
Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 71–72 (2000).
28
For an examination of the distinct types of rights and legal obligations, see generally
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710, 717 (1917) [hereinafter Judicial Reasoning]; Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913) [hereinafter Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions].
27
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fire an employee for any reason—good or bad—or for no reason at all.29 Notably,
at-will employment is rather unique to the United States.30 Most western
industrialized countries presume that an employer-employee relationship is
indefinite and generally protects employees from discharge without just cause.31
According to legal scholars, the origin of at-will employment doctrine can be traced
back to an inadvertent misstatement of then-existing labor law by treatise writer
Horace C. Wood.32 In his 1877 legal treatise titled Master and Servant, Wood sought
to distinguish American and English common law.33 However, in doing so, Wood
erroneously cited four cases he claimed supported the principle that an employer
could discharge any employee “at will.”34 Courts around the country overlooked
Wood’s mistake, and the at-will employment doctrine quickly became embedded in
American law “without question or discussion.”35
Over the past half-century, however, American law has chipped away at this
judicially created doctrine by prohibiting employers from discharging employees for
some enumerated reasons.36 Most states, for example, have limited the harshness of
the default at-will rule by creating common-law or statutory exceptions.37 Those
29

See Payne v. W. & Atl. Railroad Company, 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884), overruled
by Hutton v. Watter, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915); see also Anne Marie Lofaso, Talking Is
Worthwhile: The Role of Employee Voice in Protecting, Enhancing, and Encouraging
Individual Rights to Job Security in a Collective System, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 55,
62–63 (2010); Summers, supra note 27, at 65.
30
See Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J.
COMPAR. L. 310, 311 (1985).
31
See id.; George K. Pitchford, An Examination of the At-Will Employment Doctrine,
AM. LIBR. ASS’N ALLIED PRO. ASS’N (Aug. 2005), https://ala-apa.org/newsletter/2005/08/17
/an-examination-of-the-at-will-employment-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/QDX6-JAC6].
32
Summers, supra note 27, at 67.
33
Id.
34
Id.; see also Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule,
20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 126–127 (1976); HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877) (“With us, the rule is inflexible, that a general
hiring or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will. . . .”).
35
Summers, supra note 27, at 68.
36
Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, 124
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 3–4 (2001).
37
Id. at 4. Montana’s Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987 is the only
state law that grants a general employee right to just-cause dismissal. See MONT. CODE. ANN.
§§ 39-2-901 to -915 (2021). Montana defines a discharge as “wrongful only if: (a) it was in
retaliation for the employee’s refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of
public policy; (b) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the
employer’s probationary period of employment; or (c) the employer materially violated an
express provision of its own written personnel policy prior to the discharge, and the violation
deprived the employee of a fair and reasonable opportunity to remain in a position of
employment with the employer.” Id. § 39-2-904(1). For an in-depth history chronicling the
events leading to codification of this act and recording the act’s immediate impact on
Montana workplaces and beyond, see LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana Employment Law and
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exceptions typically prohibit employers from discharging an at-will employee for
reasons that violate an explicit, well-established public policy found in state law.38
At the federal level, Congress has passed statutes such as the National Labor
Relations Act of 193539 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,40 both of which
forbid employers from discriminating against employees for certain enumerated
reasons, such as union animus,41 race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.42 Since
the passage of these landmark civil rights acts, Congress has created additional
causes of action protecting employees from employment discrimination “because
of” age,43 disabling conditions,44 and other reasons that Congress has determined are
“bad enough” to prohibit employers from making adverse employment decisions
based on these reasons.45 Thus, most U.S. employees who feel that their employers
have treated them unjustly have no option but to try to fit their square-peg situation
into one of the round-holes afforded by law.
This state of the law has contributed to two significant problems that incentivize
employers and employees to seek alternative dispute resolution.46 First, public
reaction to unfair employment practices has coincided with “a steep rise in
administrative regulation of the workplace, whose overlapping mandates (both
federal and state) impose significant costs on employers and employees.”47 Second,
“is the explosion of litigation under laws that rely in whole or in part on individual
lawsuits for enforcement.”48
the 1987 Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L.
REV. 94 (1990).
38
See generally Summers, supra note 27, at 66 (“[T]he doctrine of employment at will,
its fundamental assumptions, and its ambivalence.”); Muhl supra note 36, at 4 (charting data
showing that only seven states had not adopted the public policy exception and only four
states had no exception to the at-will rule).
39
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
40
42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
41
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
42
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
43
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34.
44
29 U.S.C. § 794 (prohibiting disability discrimination in federal employment); 42
U.S.C. § 12131 (prohibiting disability discrimination in the private sector).
45
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2018) (clarifying that Title VII prohibits
discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or a medical condition related to pregnancy
or childbirth); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, §
101, 122 Stat. 881, 883 (2008) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1182) (prohibiting
discrimination because of genetic information).
46
See DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 19 (1995), https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/7903
9/DunlopCommissionFutureWorkerManagementFinalReport.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=
y [https://perma.cc/N42J-NBHK] [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION].
47
See id. at 49–60.
48
See id. (identifying the Fair Labor Standards Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as
primary examples of such privately enforced laws).
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By the 1980s, nonunion employers had already begun to experiment with
internal dispute resolution mechanisms to reduce the cost of litigation arising from
employment disputes.49 Based partly on the Supreme Court’s endorsement of
arbitration in the early 1990s,50 employers’ experiments with internal dispute
resolution resulted in an increase in forced arbitration clauses for at-will employees
by the dawn of the twenty-first century.51 This development is discussed below.
A. The Rise of the Illusory At-Will Employment Contract
The story of employee access to workplace justice over the past 150 years is
one of reaction and counter-reaction to changing legal rights and obligations. As
explained above, around the turn of the twentieth century, it was commonplace for
industrial employers to dictate terms and conditions of employment.52 This in itself
was a considerable change given that just a century earlier there were few (if any)
industrial employers, so the employer-employee relationship was organized very
differently.53 Indeed, by the early twentieth century, the industrial employer’s
prerogative to discharge an employee at will had become so legally entrenched that
the Supreme Court, in Lochner v. New York,54 had arrogated the employer’s freedom
49

See Thomas J. Barnes & Jeffrey S. Rueble, Making Wrongful Discharge Right, 66
MICH. BAR J. 128, 129–30 (1987).
50
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 22 (1991) (holding that
statutory age discrimination claims are arbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act).
51
COLVIN, supra note 7, at 1, 3.
52
See Summers, supra note 27, at 66–68; see generally Andrew Lisa, Major Laws that
Changed the Workplace over the Last 100 Years, STACKER (May 21, 2019),
https://stacker.com/stories/3093/major-laws-changed-workplace-over-last-100-years
[https://perma.cc/CQ6Q-33CU].
53
The changes in the employment relationship between pre-industrial Britain and postindustrial America are much more significant, reflecting a transition in the employment
relationship from one of status to contract. See generally Otto Kahn-Freund, Blackstone’s
Neglected Child: The Contract of Employment Law, 93 L.Q. REV. 508, 524 (1977)
(explaining that Blackstone’s treatment of the employment relationship under master-servant
law describes pre-industrial British law). In Blackstone’s Neglected Child, Professor KahnFreund makes three significant observations before concluding that Blackstone’s
Commentaries regarding the employment relationship were outdated from the moment the
print became dry on the first publication. First, Kahn-Freund observes that Blackstone’s
Commentaries, considered by many to be the greatest legal tome of modern English law,
contains only a small section on contract law, which itself fails to include anything about the
employment contract. Id. at 509–11. Second, he observes that employment law was instead
treated under the law of master and servant. Id. at 511. Third, Kahn-Freund notes the paucity
of change between the first publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries on master-servant law
and later publications in the mid-nineteenth century, even though the “active lifetime of
Blackstone’s Commentaries as the dominant textbook of English law, roughly 1770 to 1850,
more or less coincide with the period normally assigned by economic historians to the
industrial revolution” in Britain. Id. at 523–24.
54
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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to contract (or terminate) the services of employees to a cognizable, constitutionally
protected liberty interest.55
During the Lochner era (1905–1937), Congress passed the Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925 (“FAA”)56 in response to the perception that courts were unduly hostile
towards arbitration as put forth by a major lobbying campaign backed by the New
York Chamber of Commerce and the American Bar Association’s Committee on
Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law.57 Prior to the FAA’s passage in 1925,
courts routinely refused to enforce arbitration agreements as against public policy.58
The purpose of the statute was to provide for the “enforceability of arbitration
agreements between merchants—parties presumed to be of approximately equal
bargaining strength—who needed a way to resolve their disputes expeditiously and
inexpensively.”59 The Supreme Court described the FAA as “reflecting both a
‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,’ and the ‘fundamental principle that
arbitration is a matter of contract.’”60 The Court thus demanded that courts “place
arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, and enforce them
according to their terms.”61
B. The Rise of Litigation to Vindicate Workers’ Rights
Throughout the Lochner era and beyond, progressive interests whittled away at
the at-will rule on legislative, regulatory, and judicial fronts.62 For example,
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Congress passed the New Deal legislation,63
which, among other things, limited the employer privilege to fire employees because
of union animus.64 And eventually, the Supreme Court adopted a more progressive
stance on employment contracts when it overruled Lochner.65
In the post-Lochner world, workplace regulations proliferated, which raised the
floor of rights upon which employers and employees could “negotiate” the terms
and conditions of employment. At the federal level, Congress passed legislation that
55

Id. at 57–58.
Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C §§ 1–14).
57
STONE & COLVIN, supra note 13, at 7.
58
Arbitration: Past, Precedents, and Future, JONES FOSTER (June 17, 2019),
https://jonesfoster.com/our-perspective/arbitration-article-1
[https://perma.cc/SGA8XPA9].
59
Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 106 (2006).
60
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citations
omitted).
61
Id. (citations omitted).
62
See Summers, supra note 27, at 66–68.
63
See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW
DEAL: 1932–1940 (2009) (describing the history and development of the New Deal).
64
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
65
See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding as
constitutional a state minimum wage law); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 49 (1937) (upholding as constitutional the National Labor Relations Act).
56
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improved the lives of working people. For example, in the 1930s, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act of
1935,66 which protected for the first time workers’ rights to band together for mutual
aid or protection,67 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,68 which instituted a
federal minimum wage69 and mandated paid time and a half for overtime work.70
The FLSA also prohibited child labor.71 The 1940s witnessed clarification of these
laws72 as well as the creation of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
established to help mediate and settle labor disputes.73
Passage of workplace rights greatly accelerated in the 1960s with Congress’s
enactment of the Equal Pay Act of 1963,74 which prohibits employers from pay wage
differentials based on sex;75 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,76 which
prohibits employment discrimination because of race, color national origin, sex, and
religion;77 and the Age Discrimination in Employment of 1967,78 which prohibits
employers from discriminating against workers ages forty years and older because
of age.79 The 1970s also witnessed great improvements in workers’ rights to a safer
66

169).

Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–

67
29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (granting employees the right under NLRA Section 7 to selforganize, to join, form, or assist a union, to engage in collective bargaining, or to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection; and making it unlawful
under Section 8 for employers to (1) interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the
exercise of their union rights and rights to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection; (2) dominate or control a union; (3) discriminate against workers because of their
union activity; (4) retaliate against workers; (5) refuse to bargain with workers’
representatives).
68
Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–
219).
69
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206).
70
Id. § 7 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 207) (prohibiting employers from
allowing employees to work more than forty hours per week unless the employer
compensates the employee at a rate of at least one-and-one-half times the employee’s hourly
rate). Under the FLSA, Congress reduced the maximum work week first to forty-four hours
and then to forty hours by 1940.
71
Id. § 12 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 212).
72
See Pub. L. No. 77-283, 55 Stat. 756 (1941) (clarifying the forty-hour week as
permitting no more than “two thousand and eighty hours during any period of fifty-two
consecutive weeks” subject to the minimum wage provisions).
73
In 1947, Congress also created the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. See
Pub. L. No. 95-524, 61 Stat. 152 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 171–183).
74
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206).
75
29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
76
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-17).
77
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
78
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–
634).
79
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631.
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and healthier workplace,80 to guaranteed retirement pensions,81 and to freedom from
workplace discrimination because of pregnancy.82
In the final two decades of the twentieth century, Congress enacted the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988,83 which requires employers to
provide employees with sixty-days’ notice of plant closings or mass economic
dismissals,84 the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,85 which prohibits
employers from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabling
conditions,86 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,87 entitling employees
to take reasonable medical leave for the birth or adoption of a child or to care for a
child, spouse, or parent with a serious medical condition.88
The twenty-first century has given us the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 200889 (prohibiting discrimination in group health plan
coverage based on genetic information),90 and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009.91 Finally, the Supreme Court has at times interpreted these laws as requiring
additional employer obligations to employees.92
There are also numerous state laws regulating the workplace; for example, state
human rights laws often complement Title VII.93 Moreover, nearly every state has a
minimum wage law that is higher than the federal minimum wage.94
As this brief historical sketch of only some significant labor law changes makes
clear, by the late twentieth century there were significant exceptions to the at-will
80

See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678) (requiring employers to maintain certain
workplace safety and health standards).
81
See Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (regulating private
employment group pension plans).
82
See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (extending Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination in employment
to pregnant workers).
83
Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
2101–2109).
84
See 29 U.S.C. § 2102.
85
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213).
86
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 121112.
87
Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654).
88
See 29 U.S.C. 2612.
89
Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881.
90
42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1.
91
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (making sex-based wage differentials unlawful each
time the employer issues remuneration).
92
See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (interpreting Title VII
as prohibiting employers from discriminating against gay and transgender workers).
93
See, e.g., 5 ME. REV. STATS. §§ 4551–4634; W. VA. CODE, §§ 5-11-1 to 5-11-20.
94
See Consolidated Minimum Wage Table, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR (Jan. 1, 2022),
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/mw-consolidated [https://perma.cc/TC2N-UZN9].
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employment rule that an employer could fire an employee for any reason. With every
legislative, executive, or judicial encroachment on the at-will doctrine, the terms and
conditions of employment became increasingly more favorable for employees.95 For
example, an employer’s offer of employment in the 1880s might look identical to an
employment offer given in the 1980s, but in 1880 an employer could lawfully fire
the employee because he was Black and in 1980 the employer could not.
Yet, traditionally, workers could only vindicate their rights through litigation.
Workplace conflict is expensive, and the cost of workplace conflict rises with
increased labor standards.96 Under the pure at-will employment legal system that
existed in the United States pre-1964, employers could simply discharge employees
involved in conflict, regardless of whether that discharge constituted just cause.97
95

The decline of the at-will doctrine coincided with growing scholarly commentary on
the subject. The first law review article to criticize the employment at-will doctrine was
published in 1967. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405–06,
1410–13 (1967) (discussing the employer’s unilateral privilege to terminate workers’
employment as the prime source of its power over those workers; criticizing the inadequacy
of limitations on that power, primarily stemming from just clause causes in collectivebargaining agreements or individual contracts of employment; and noting that the infrequent
use of state criminal laws to prohibit employers from coercing employees in certain respects
does nothing to compensate the coerced employee for employment loss). Between 1971 and
1979, only one law review article turns up in a Westlaw search for the term “employment atwill.” See J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security,
26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974). But, between 1980 and 1999, the same search turns up 1,827
articles, many of which trace the development of the at-will doctrine and the courts’ role in
chipping away at that doctrine. See, e.g., Justin R. Olsen, The Course of the Employment-AtWill Doctrine in Utah: Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.—A Turning of the Tide, 5 B.Y.U. J.
PUB. L. 249, 250 (1991) (discussing the “development of the employment-at-will doctrine in
Utah and the Utah Supreme Court’s recent recognition of exceptions to the doctrine”); Mark
R. Kramer, Comment, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment
At Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 227–28 (1984) (examining
emerging exceptions to the at-will-employment doctrine); Susan Ward, Note, Three New
Exceptions to the Employment At Will Doctrine—Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.
2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984), 60 WASH. L. REV. 209, 209–11 (1984) (discussing then-recent
state supreme court case limiting Washington employer’s right to discharge employees).
Nevertheless, the at-will doctrine still reigns supreme. See generally Summers, supra note
27 (discussing the roots of the at-will and the development of judicial and statutory
circumvention of the rule, while concluding that the perception of employer domination over
its employees remains the dominant narrative).
96
See Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: The
Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007).
97
Prior to passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2, 77 Stat. 56, 56
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-17), the U.S. workplace was largely unregulated except for minimum wage
maximum hour legislation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201–219, and
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Viewing the employment relationship as a contract for work, labor standards raise
the cost of breaching that contract. No longer does the employment relationship
merely constitute work in exchange for wages earned. The employment relationship
has become a much more complex relationship, imbued with employer duties to
maintain a discrimination-free, harassment-free, safe workplace and to pay
employees for work performed. In this manner, the employment relationship is
simply more expensive to maintain than it was fifty years ago.98
A few caveats are notable. First, to argue that legal duties are costly is not to
indict the worker. To the contrary, employers have little to fear regarding labor
standards if they meet those standards. Employer arguments for removing labor
standards are arguments for making breaching the employment contract less
expensive. So long as the labor standard is something that we value, employer
arguments for removing this so-called Kaldor-Hicks inefficiency99 are morally
reprehensible.
Second, the possibility that workers would sue employers who had not
breached labor standards is not to indict labor standards. Rather, it identifies a market
failure—vexatious or fraudulent litigation—which must be treated separately.100 Just
as there are unscrupulous employers, there are unscrupulous workers who are
willing to invent workplace grievances in hopes of a legal settlement.101 Eliminating
labor standards to eliminate the possibility of fraud is simply a cure worse than the
disease.

regulation of the unionized workplace, most prominently under the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151–169.
98
See Lofaso, supra note 96, at 8.
99
Overview: Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, OXFORD REFERENCE, https://www.oxfordrefer
ence.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100028833 [https://perma.cc/EB2K-RSC3]
(last visited June 25, 2022) (“In economic theory, an alteration in the allocation of resources
is said to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient when it produces more benefits than costs.”); see also
WASH. CTR. EQUITABLE GROWTH, Efficiency, Inequality, and the Costs of Redistribution,
(Aug. 5, 2014), https://equitablegrowth.org/efficiency-inequality-costs-redistribution/
[https://perma.cc/D3A5-4SYW] (“[E]conomists Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks stated that
an outcome is efficient if a person made better off by a change in economic circumstances
could compensate a person made worse off by the change. Think of opening up domestic
markets to freer international trade. If the winners from reduced tariffs in those markets could
compensate the losers in those same markets from the move then opening up those markets
would result in a more efficient domestic economy, according to the two economists. . . .
Now there’s a very important word in the definition of the principle that might slip by: could.
Under the Kaldor-Hicks principle an outcome is efficient if the winners could compensate
the losers. They don’t actually have to do it for the new outcome to qualify as efficient. So
the winners of newly opened markets don’t have to compensate the workers who have lost
jobs. They could, but they don’t have to in order for the situation to be efficient.”).
100
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2020).
101
How to Handle Frivolous Lawsuits, JEFFREY M. VERDON LAW GROUP, LLP, (Mar.
14, 2019), https://jmvlaw.com/handle-frivolous-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/FG75-7398].
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Third, and unrelated to the other two arguments, it is important to place the cost
argument in a historical and economic context. It is true that in a vacuum, labor
standards are more expensive than having no standards102 due to the cost of
implementing such standards as well as potential litigation costs for potential
breaches and the defense of frivolous lawsuits.103 But the issue is complicated by the
fact that labor standards may, in the long run, save costs.
The Dunlop Report, written almost twenty years ago, described the costs
associated with workplace litigation: “For every dollar paid to employees through
litigation, at least another dollar is paid to attorneys involved in handling both
meritorious and non-meritorious claims.”104 In addition to pointing out the direct
costs of litigation—in terms of attorney’s fees—the Dunlop Report elaborated on
two other drawbacks to litigation. First, litigation is typically unavailable to
working-class employees.105 Second, litigation is inefficient. Claims linger,
subjecting employees, already the victim of indignity or injustice, to additional stress
and humiliation.106
Relatedly, Congress amended Title VII107 in 1991 to permit jury trials108 and to
allow plaintiffs to recover emotional distress and punitive damages109 while
simultaneously capping the total amount of damages a Title VII plaintiff can

102

See Lofaso, supra note 96, at 8.
See id.
104
See DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 46, at 49.
105
Id. at 49–50 (“[W]hile the prospective costs of court awards do serve to deter
employers from illegal actions, it is not clear that litigation protects all kinds of employees
equally well. Most employment discrimination suits are brought by employees who have
already left the job where the discrimination took place. Further, those ex-employees who
bring suit tend to come from the ranks of managers and professionals rather than from lowerlevel workers.”).
106
Id. at 50 (“[E]ven for those employees properly situated to file suit, the pursuit of a
legal claim through litigation often proves stressful and unsatisfying. Overburdened federal
and state judicial dockets mean that years often pass before an aggrieved employee is able to
present his or her claim in court. The combative nature of litigation tends to push the
employee to the sidelines in this legal struggle, though occasionally subjecting employees to
detailed investigation of their personal histories and character.” (footnote omitted)); see also
Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 982 (2003) (summarizing the perceived fears of the litigation explosion
but concluding that more data is needed before drawing conclusions and arguing that
efficiency should not swallow other values).
107
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a federal law that protects employees
against discrimination based on certain specified characteristics: race, color, national origin,
sex, and religion. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241,
253–66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
108
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
109
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a), (b) (creating right to recover compensatory and punitive
damages under Title VII).
103
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recover.110 To the extent that defendant employers already perceived litigation as an
expensive option, the caps on recovery were a significant compromise. Antidiscrimination laws, arguably the most prominent type of federal labor standard
enacted since the 1960s,111 have contributed to the rise in workplace dispute
resolution costs if only by virtue of their existence. The more charges that employees
file, the more pressure there is to lower these costs.
In short, firms, which are always interested in maximizing profit, have an
interest in reducing workplace conflict—or at least in reducing the cost of conflict.
As litigation costs increase and as the floor of employment rights increases,
employers have turned to internal grievance mechanisms as an alternative—and less
expensive—source of conflict resolution.112
C. Mid-Century Criticism of Litigation and the Push for Alternative Dispute
Resolution
At least by mid-century, academics were already raising such complaints about
litigation, including in the workplace context: “There is widespread perception that
our judicial system needs changing. It is expensive, unnecessarily technical,
intrusive on private relations, and it gives an unfair advantage to the wealthy and
powerful. Labor arbitration, by contrast, is frequently pointed to as the paradigm of
private justice.”113 These observations resulted in a significant and ongoing legal
debate centered around the question whether the United States was an overly
litigious society114 and whether alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms were
necessary.115
Hidden in these arguments is an assumption against regulatory and labor
standards. If only workers did not hold rights and employers did not owe legal
obligations employers could terminate the employment relationship at will and there
would be no litigation. Even if the odd employee sued every now and again, a court
would simply dismiss the case on the employer’s motion to dismiss for failure to
110

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (limiting amount recoverable to $300,000 in the case of
employers with 500 or more employees; $200,000 in the case of employers with 201–500
employees; $100,000 in the case of employers with 101–200 employees; and $50,000 in the
case of employers with 15–100 employees).
111
See Lisa, supra note 52 (highlighting “landmark” anti-discrimination legislation,
such as the Civil Rights Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, and Americans with Disabilities Act).
112
See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Lofaso, supra note 96, at 7–8
(discussing labor standards in terms of cost and efficiency).
113
Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L. J. 916,
916, 916 (1979); see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE. L.J. 1073, 1073–75
(1984) (noting this phenomenon).
114
See Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Workload and Perceived “Bureaucracy” of the
Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68
IOWA L. REV. 871, 871–74 (1983).
115
See Fiss, supra note 113, at 1075.
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state a claim upon which relief could be granted.116 In effect, labor standards are
viewed as incompatible with wealth maximization, as measured in terms of the
Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency, whereby the breaching party to a transaction
is “willing and able to pay enough to compensate fully those who are hurt by the
[transaction] whether or not such compensation is ever actually made, either before
or after the transfer takes place.”117 Simply put, labor standards make it more costly
to discharge at-will employees.118
As noted above, workers’ rights and employers’ legal obligations to their
employees to refrain from firing them without good cause have been increasing
throughout the late twentieth century into the present time. Employers, who wished
to reduce litigation costs, sought a solution in alternative dispute resolution.119
D. Using Pre-Dispute, Forced Arbitration Agreements to Limit Wrongful
Discharge Litigation
Employers sought new ways to avoid the costs of wrongful discharge litigation;
one such way was to ask employees to sign pre-dispute, forced arbitration
agreements.120 Notwithstanding the existence of the FAA—passed in 1925 to codify
the right to enforce arbitration agreements just like any other contract as a way to
limit court costs—the option to force employees to arbitrate their employment
disputes and forfeit court review of that claim appeared unavailable in 1980.121 For
example, in 1974, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, the Supreme Court
held that an employee, who had arbitrated his federal statutory discrimination claim
under an arbitration clause in a collective-bargaining agreement, did not forfeit his
right to bring his Title VII discrimination claim to court based on the same set of
facts.122
Despite the Supreme Court’s initial hesitancy to curtail litigation in favor of
arbitration, alternative dispute resolution was gaining in popularity as a method for
reducing litigation costs and as a means of protecting the autonomy and privacy of
those subject to lawsuits. As early as 1981, Professor Douglas Laycock endorsed (as
constitutional) the presumption of an internal dispute resolution mechanism for the

116

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL
STUDS. 227, 235–36 (1980) (“The Kaldor-Hicks test is fully equivalent to the principle of
wealth maximization.”).
118
For an in-depth analysis of this argument, see Lofaso, supra note 96, at 8.
119
See Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective
Bargaining Process, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 576 (1990) (stating that labor arbitration
enables “contracting parties to resolve their bargaining agreement disputes in an informal,
inexpensive, and relatively expeditious manner”).
120
See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1631, 1639–40 (2005).
121
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974).
122
Id. at 48.
117
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employment disputes of religious institutions.123 Professor Laycock argued that
disputes between religious institutions and their employees should be resolved
internally,124 based in part on the principle that religious institutions have a
constitutional right to decide their own internal disputes.125
The watershed moment for nonunion employment arbitration came with the
Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corporation.126 There, the employer discharged its employee Gilmer, a 68-year-old
manager, and replaced him with a much younger person.127 At the time Gilmer was
hired in 1981, he had signed, as a condition of employment, a broker registration
form that contained a compulsory arbitration agreement.128 Six years later, Gilmer
sued the employer in district court, alleging age discrimination.129 The employer
moved to compel arbitration under the FAA Section 2, which provides that “[a]
written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”130 The United States
Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of that motion,131 and the case
proceeded to the United States Supreme Court.132
The Supreme Court held that Congress did not preclude arbitration of age
discrimination claims when it enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).133 The Court also determined that “statutory claims may be the subject of
an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.”134 The Court gave a
legalistic contractual analysis for its decision: “Having made the bargain to arbitrate,
the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”135
In rejecting Gilmer’s argument that Congress intended to preclude waiver of
judicial remedies for age discrimination claims,136 the Court made the following four
123

See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373,
1373–74 (1981).
124
See id. at 1396, 1404, 1408–09.
125
See id.; id. at 1389 n.131. In his discussion, Professor Laycock cites, among other
cases, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). Id. This case explains that the first
amendment “severely circumscribes” a civil court’s authority to resolve church land
disputes. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602.
126
500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
127
Id. at 23–24.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
9 U.S.C. § 2.
131
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 26–27.
134
Id. at 26.
135
Id. (quoting Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)).
136
Id.
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observations. First, although forced arbitration clauses may deprive litigants of a
judicial forum granted by statute, laws such as the ADEA would continue to serve
their remedial and deterrent functions “so long as the prospective litigant[s]
effectively may vindicate [their] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”137
Second, the ADEA’s statutory text favors “informal methods of conciliation”138 and
is consistent with “out-of-court dispute resolution, such as arbitration.”139 Third,
arbitrators do not necessarily favor employers, and arbitration is not necessarily a
deficient dispute resolution mechanism.140 Fourth, although the bargaining power
inequality between employers and employees might render employee free choice
illusory, that is “not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never
enforceable in the employment context.”141
The Court left open the question whether the FAA excludes employment
contracts from forced arbitration, notwithstanding the plain language of FAA
Section 1: “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.”142 The Court concluded that it did not have to reach that
question because the forced arbitration clause was located in Gilmer’s broker
agreement rather than his employment agreement.143 This argument seems strained,
not only as too narrowly construed as the dissent pointed out,144 but also because
signing the broker agreement was in this case a condition of employment.145 In
contract terms, this would mean that the broker agreement was incorporated by
reference into the at-will employment contract.146 The Court’s glibness in
distinguishing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company primarily on grounds that
137

Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
138
Id. at 29.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 30–33.
141
Id. at 33.
142
Id. at 49–52.
143
Id. at 25, n.2. But see id. at 36–43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144
Id. at 38–39.
145
Id. at 40.
146
See 11 Williston, ON CONTRACTS, § 30:25 (4th ed. 2013) (“Generally, all writings
which are part of the same transaction are interpreted together. . . . One application of this
principle is the situation in which the parties have expressed their intention to have one
document’s provision read into a separate document. As long as the contract makes clear
reference to the document and describes it in such terms that its identity may be ascertained
beyond doubt, the parties to a contract may incorporate contractual terms by reference to a
separate, noncontemporaneous document, including a separate agreement to which they are
not parties, and including a separate document which is unsigned. It is not necessary to refer
to or incorporate the entire document; if the parties so desire, they may incorporate a portion
of the document.” (citations omitted)). Taking the Court’s reasoning and the employer’s
contention to their logical conclusion would mean that any time an at-will employee signs a
broker agreement with a general arbitration clause, then that employee would have a right to
arbitrate disputes that she would not ordinarily have a right to litigate.
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the employees in Alexander never contractually agreed to arbitrate their Title VII
claims147 further highlights the overly formalistic reasoning of Gilmer. The Supreme
Court answered the question left open in Gilmer ten years later when, in Circuit City,
Inc. v. Adams, it held that forced arbitration of claims involving employment
discrimination disputes under the ADEA were permissible under the FAA.148
The Court further curtailed individual employees’ rights to have their day in
court in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, where it held that “a collective-bargaining
agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA
claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law.”149 In other words, a union and an
employer can waive an individual’s right to judicial review of that individual’s
ADEA claim.
The most recent and pernicious developments in workplace dispute resolution
involve the coupling of arbitration with class-action waivers. In AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, the Court held that the FAA permits consumers to waive their rights
to participate in a class action lawsuit by signing a forced arbitration agreement to
that effect.150 Similarly, in Epic Systems v. Lewis, the Court held that mandatory
arbitration agreements providing for individualized proceedings and waiving the
right to participate in class actions, do not violate the NLRA.151 Justice Neil Gorsuch,
writing for the majority, noted that neither the FAA nor the NLRA specified that
class-action waivers within arbitration agreements were unlawful.152 He claimed that
by contesting the individualized nature of arbitration proceedings, plaintiffs sought
to interfere with the most fundamental attributes of arbitration—informality and
speed.153 Gorsuch wrote, “[w]hile Congress is of course always free to amend this
judgment, we see nothing suggesting it did so in the NLRA—much less that it
manifested a clear intention to displace the [FAA]. Because we can easily read
Congress’s statutes to work in harmony, that is where our duty lies.”154
The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) addressed
questions involving mandatory arbitration agreements following the Supreme
Court’s Epic Systems decision. Specifically, the Board, which had by then
transitioned from a Democratic-led majority under the Obama administration to a
Republican-led majority under the Trump administration, held that employers were
not prohibited under the NLRA from notifying employees that failing or refusing to
sign a mandatory arbitration agreement would result in their discharge or from
promulgating mandatory arbitration agreements in response to employees opting
into a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act or state wage-and-hour

147

415 U.S. 36, 49–52 (1974).
532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding that the FAA applies to all non-transportation
employment contracts).
149
556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009).
150
563 U.S. 333, 339, 356–57 (2011).
151
138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
152
Id. at 1626–27.
153
Id. at 1622.
154
Id. at 1632.
148
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laws.155 Employers were, however, prohibited from taking adverse action against
employees for engaging in concerted activity156 by filing a class or collective action,
consistent with the Board’s long-standing precedent.157
The significance of these cases is clear: Employers prefer to arbitrate
employment disputes and have won, by judicial fiat, the privilege to compel
arbitration for employment disputes as a condition of employment. This means that
employers compelling arbitration as a condition of employment face almost no
chance of ever having to formally litigate and defend against claims of violating an
employee’s supposedly “inalienable” rights.158
II. ASSESSING LITIGATION AND INTERNAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
Just because forced-arbitration agreements limit litigation opportunities,
including jury trials, does not mean that all arbitration agreements are fundamentally
bad. Indeed, for much of the twentieth century, many scholars and practitioners
viewed arbitration as the panacea for the ills created by litigation.159 This section
considers the pros and cons of litigation and forced arbitration to draw informed
conclusions about the efficacy of each dispute-resolution mechanism.
To evaluate any dispute-resolution mechanism, it is important to create
standards by which to judge dispute mechanisms and to use those standards to assess
the strengths and weaknesses of litigation and other dispute mechanisms. Nearly
forty-five years ago, Professor Julius Getman devised the following rubric for
making such an assessment, which this article adopts:
(1) Finality. Once decided, are cases likely to be retried or appealed?
(2) Obedience. Are the decisions put into effect or are they rendered
meaningless by subsequent refusals to carry them out?
(3) Guidance. Do the decisions provide necessary guidance to the parties
involved in the dispute? Can they subsequently structure behavior in a
reasonable fashion and avoid future litigation?
(4) Efficiency. Are the majority of disputes settled without a formal
155

See Cordúa Restaurants, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 43 (2019).
See 29 U.S.C. § 157.
157
See id.
158
See Estlund, supra note 12, at 703–05.
159
See, e.g., Getman, supra note 113, at 916 (“There is a widespread perception that
our judicial system needs changing. It is expensive, unnecessarily technical, intrusive on
private relations, and it gives unfair advantage to the wealthy and powerful. Labor
arbitration, by contrast, is frequently pointed to as the paradigm of private justice.”);
Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1483 (1959)
(expressing concerns that courts might inject themselves into labor-contract-interpretation
disputes thereby disrupting labor arbitration); Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The
New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 269 (1926) (explaining that the newly
enacted Federal Arbitration Law would alleviate court delay due to docket congestion,
expensive litigation, and failure of litigation to result in just solutions, while also expressing
the idea that the law had commercial (not labor) arbitration in mind).
156
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hearing? When cases are tried, are the procedures adequate, flexible, and
suited to the particular issue? Are the benefits achieved from the system
economical compared to the costs?
(5) Availability. Is the dispute-resolution machinery routinely available
without undue expense to people whose behavior is governed by the
system, and are they provided with adequate representation?
(6) Neutrality. Do the decision-makers avoid favoritism and bias for one
side or another?
(7) Conflict Reduction. Does the entire process, including the adjudication,
lead to more amicable relations and contribute to mutual respect among
the potential disputants?
(8) Fairness. Will the disputes be resolved in a way that appropriately
recognizes the interests of the various parties likely to come before the
system?160
While these are not the only factors useful in assessing dispute-resolution systems,
they do serve as a starting point for discussion.161
Using Professor Getman’s factors, Section A examines the effectiveness of
litigation, while Section B examines the effectiveness of ADR.
A. Resolving Employment Disputes Through Formal Litigation
The most formal method of resolving an employment dispute is through
litigation.162 One benefit litigation provides is the uniform procedure found in
federal, state, and local rules.163 For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Federal Rules of
Evidence govern federal court proceedings.164 These rules are so central to the U.S.
litigation system that failure to follow them could result in dismissal of the
160

Getman, supra note 113, at 916.
The dispute systems design (DSD) field, where a dispute systems designer creates a
custom conflict resolution process for an institutional client, has created a number of similar
assessment tools. See generally NANCY H. ROGERS, ROBERT C. BORDONE, FRANK E.A.
SANDER & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING
DISPUTES (2d ed. 2019).
162
Legal Information Institute, Litigation: Overview, CORNELL L. SCH.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/litigation [https://perma.cc/6JE7-ELNM] (last visited June
25, 2022).
163
See J. Michael Goodson Law Library, Court Rules Research Guide, DUKE U. SCH.
L. (Nov. 2017), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/lib/courtrules.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B9FY-W94S] (last visited June 25, 2022).
164
A set of the most current federal rules is available on the U.S. courts website. See
Current Rules of Practice and Procedure, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/current-rules.aspx [https://perma.cc/M7FK-FD9H] (last visited Aug. 25,
2022). Administrative proceedings, such as those governing proceedings before the National
Labor Relations Board or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, also have their
own set of rules. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 101–103 (2018).
161
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lawsuit.165 Simply put, formal court proceedings and the accompanying rules of
practice are considered “essential to court operations and maintaining a fair and
impartial federal judiciary.”166
Under Professor Getman’s rubric—finality, obedience, guidance, efficiency,
availability, neutrality, conflict reduction, and fairness—litigation is likely to result
in justice but at a cost in terms of time, judicial and litigant resources, and
exacerbation of already vexatious relations.167 Simply stated, litigation is final—
eventually.168 Although not required as a matter of constitutional law, our justice
165

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (“If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the
complaint is filed, the court--on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff--must
dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made
within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must
extend the time for service for an appropriate period.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v) (“If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or
permit discovery, . . . the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders. . . .
includ[ing] . . . dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part”); FED. R. CIV. P.
41(b) (“If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a
defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order
states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this
rule—except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under
Rule 19—operates as an adjudication on the merits.”); FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(2) (“An
appellant’s failure to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for the court of appeals to act as it
considers appropriate, including dismissing the appeal.”); FED. R. APP. P. 31(c) (“If an
appellant fails to file a brief within the time provided by this rule, or within an extended time,
an appellee may move to dismiss the appeal. An appellee who fails to file a brief will not be
heard at oral argument unless the court grants permission.”).
166
See United States District Court: Eastern District of California, Rules (2022),
https://www.caed.uscourts.gov/CAEDnew/index.cfm/rules/
[https://perma.cc/5XPJBAAW].
167
U.S. litigation is, of course, adversarial and the adversarial process is more
contentious by design. See generally Stephan Landsman, Introduction to the Adversary
System, in READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION 1 (1988).
168
There are two legal maxims that support the foundational premise that litigation
should be final. First, “[i]t reipublicae ut sit finis litium,” meaning “it is for the public good
that there be an end to litigation.” HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 330
(7th Am. ed. 1874). Second, “nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa”—a person should not
be troubled twice for the same reason. See Arthur L. Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in
Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221, 240 (1910). These doctrines are commonly considered
especially critical in terms of res judicata and double jeopardy. See Note, Double Jeopardy:
The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1272 (1964); E. H. Schopler, Modern
Status of Doctrine of Res Judicata in Criminal Cases, 9 A.L.R.3d 203 (originally published
in 1966). See also Fleming James, Jr., Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U.
PA. L. REV. 173, 184 (1959) (discussing policies favoring finality of judgments, summing up
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system insists on appellate review of cases for three reasons: to correct mistakes; to
develop legal precedent, and to ensure justice.169 These goals, though important,
make the litigation process time-consuming and costly.170 Additionally, court orders,
once issued, are likely to be obeyed because courts possess contempt powers.171
Litigation, more than any other system, employs neutral advocates, whose job is to
resolve conflicts in a fair manner while considering the various interests of all parties
to the dispute.172 Moreover, court decisions, when clearly written, not only provide
the necessary guidance to the parties involved in the dispute, but also provide
guidance to similarly situated future litigants through precedential opinions.173
Sophisticated parties can structure their behavior based on judicial precedents to
avoid future litigation.174
By contrast, although most disputes settle without a trial, litigation is not
considered efficient.175 In particular, the formalities associated with litigation make
it opaque to the layperson who typically needs an attorney to travail through
those policies in these two legal maxims, and explaining that the first maxim stresses the
social utility of finality whereas the second maxim “emphasizes the hardship of multiple
litigation on the individual adversary”).
169
See Anne Marie Lofaso, The Appellate Courts’ Role in the Federal Judicial System,
in A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 3 (Anne Marie Lofaso & Lawrence
D. Rosenberg eds., 2010).
170
As the former Chief Judge of the Second Circuit once explained, “[t]he relationship
between the cost of settlement and the expense of continued disagreement is immediate and
highly visible. Thus, even a party who might ultimately succeed on an appeal may prefer an
early settlement to the increasingly expensive, time-consuming process of waiting for his
case to be briefed, argued and decided.” Irving R. Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference:
An Appellate Procedural Reform, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1100 (1974). For more modern
views, see, e.g., Michele M. Jochner, To Appeal or Not to Appeal (Nov. 11, 2019),
https://familylawyermagazine.com/articles/to-appeal-or-not-to-appeal/ [https://perma.cc/6V
8K-DY47] (“[A]n appeal is a time-consuming and often expensive endeavor.”); Christine
M. Salmi, To Appeal or Not To Appeal: That Is the Question, 58 ADVOCATE 23, 24 (Aug.
2015) (“Appeals can be very time-consuming and expensive.”).
171
“The power to punish for contempt is inherent in every court at common law, and
its exercise is essentially a judicial function.” Recent Cases: Constitutional Law—
Contempt—Judicial Powers, 14 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385 (1901).
172
But see Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares
in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1431–32 (2013) (discussing the extent to
which the Roberts Court has a pro-business bias); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of
the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1117, 1156 (2009) (arguing that race and political affiliation significantly affect racediscrimination case outcome).
173
This precedential portion of a judicial opinion is often called the ratio decidendi.
Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 161
(1930).
174
See Getman, supra note 113, at 916, 923–24.
175
For a comparison between the U.S. and German litigation systems that argues that
the U.S. litigation system is intentionally more inefficient, see Samuel R. Gross, The
American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734, 734 (1987).
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technical, legal procedures.176 Litigation is therefore unavailable to those who
cannot obtain an attorney.177 Even if a disputant can obtain an attorney—because
that disputant is wealthy, poor enough to qualify for free legal services, or can find
an attorney to finance the litigation on a contingency basis—litigation may not
resolve the conflict.178 Before settlement is seriously considered, most parties will
endure costly and time-consuming discovery.179 Attorneys may even cross-move for
summary judgment upon completion of discovery.180 Those motions are, once again,
costly and time-consuming for the litigants and the judges.181 Moreover, litigation’s
combative style is certainly not conducive to conflict reduction among the parties.182
In sum, litigation exchanges efficiency for formality. Although formal
litigation guarantees complaining employees several procedural safeguards typically
not available in arbitration—including evidentiary safeguards, access to a trained
and neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to consult with and be represented by an
attorney, and the ability to appeal unfavorable decisions—the process is often timeconsuming, expensive, and increasingly antagonistic. Because of these pitfalls, both
employers and employees alike in the twentieth century urged for alternative dispute
resolution.

176

The movement to guarantee an indigent right to counsel in civil litigation
comparable to the indigent right to counsel in criminal litigation is often called “civil
Gideon” after the famed U.S. Supreme Court decision Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963). See generally Tonya L. Brito, David J. Pate Jr., Daanika Gordon & Amanda Ward,
What We Know and Need to Know About Civil Gideon, 67 S.C. L. REV. 223 (2016).
177
Cf. id. at 223–25.
178
See ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 42–45 (Penguin Press rev. ed. 2011)
(explaining how positional bargaining like litigation can fail to resolve some of the
underlying interests).
179
Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007) (calling discovery “a
sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming undertaking” (quoting Frank Easterbrook,
Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (1989))).
180
See David F. Herr & Roger S. Haydock, Cross-Motions for Summary Judgments, 2
MINN. PRAC., CIV. RULES ANNOTATED § 56.13 (6th ed. 2022) (stating that in Minnesota
“cross-motions for summary judgment [are] a common occurrence”).
181
See D. Theodore Rave, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 875, 876 (2006) (stating that summary judgment “is a frequently used motion that is
costly to oppose and . . . may be a net drain on society”).
182
See Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 570, 582 (1983) (defining the American legal system as “among the most expensive
and least efficient in the world,” and commenting on how the first-year legal curriculum—
which remains essentially unchanged thirty years later—contributes this problem by
focusing on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than alternative dispute resolution).
Bok called the failure to include alternative dispute resolution in legal education the “familiar
tilt in the law curriculum toward preparing students for legal combat.” Id.
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B. Resolving Employment Disputes Through ADR: The Rise of Forced Arbitration
in the Union and Nonunion Workplace
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a process for settling disputes using
techniques other than litigation.183 ADR is diverse and includes arbitration,
mediation, conciliation, and fact-finding.184 ADR processes have different
implications depending on whether the workplace is organized. Both unionized and
nonunionized workplaces are examined below.
1. Development of Policies Favoring Grievance-Arbitration Procedures in
Unionized Workplaces
History demonstrates that grievance arbitration has been particularly well
developed in unionized workplaces.185 During World War I, leading labor and
employer representatives, with President Woodrow Wilson’s blessing, voluntarily
agreed to create the National War Labor Board in response to the perceived need to
limit “industrial disturbances with a view to the full production of war
necessities.”186 The Board had twelve members—five labor, five management, and
183
See Alternative Dispute Resolution, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/gener
al/topic/labor-relations/adr [https://perma.cc/95E8-LMCK] (last visited June 25, 2022); see
generally Conflict Resolution & ADR Services for Government, FED. MEDIATION &
CONCILIATION SERV. (July 2015), https://www.fmcs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/FMC
SConflict_ResADR10-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4TA-2BX5].
184
For a brief overview of various forms of ADR, see Katherine V.W. Stone,
Alternative Dispute Resolution, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY (Stan Katz ed., Oxford
University Press 2009).
185
See generally Morton Gitelman, The Evolution of Labor Arbitration, 9 DEPAUL L.
REV. 181, 181–88 (1960) (detailing how labor arbitration developed alongside various union
movements); JOHN R. COMMONS, DAVID J. SAPOSS, HELEN L. SUMNER, E. B. MITTELMAN,
H. E. HOAGLAND, JOHN B. ANDREWS & SELIG PERLMAN, 2 THE HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE
UNITED STATES 16, 79, 98, 160–67, 179–80, 311–12, 325–26, 414–17, 426, 454, 479–81,
502, 508, 527–28 (reprt. 1966) (1918) (detailing the long and varied history of arbitration
and attempts at arbitration in the United States); Development of Collective Bargaining in
Metal Mining, 47 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 591, 595–98 (1938) (noting that as early as the late
1800s industrial unions had adopted arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution method);
Jesse Freidin & Francis J. Ulman, Arbitration and the National War Labor Board, 58 HARV.
L. REV. 309, 309–12 (1945) (discussing arbitration processes for the NWLB in WWII);
Alexander Hamilton Frey, Arbitration and the War Labor Board, 29 IOWA L. R. 202, 203–
04 (1944) (highlighting that arbitration in the 1940s was a viable option to resolve an issue
while keeping disputants out of contact with one another); E. L. Oliver, Arbitration of Labor
Disputes, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 206, 211–25 (1934) (detailing the history and processes of labor
arbitration); David Weiss, History of Arbitration in American Newspaper Publishing
Industry, 17 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 15 (1923); George M. Janes, The Trend of Voluntary
Conciliation and Arbitration in Labor Disputes, 69 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
173 (1917).
186
Richard B. Gregg, The National War Labor Board, 33 HARV. L. REV. 39, 39–40
(1919).
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two public representatives (Frank P. Walsh and the Honorable William H. Taft).187
By a proclamation dated April 8, 1918, President Wilson declared that one of the
Board’s main purposes was “[t]o bring about a settlement, by mediation and
conciliation, of every controversy arising between employers and workers in the
field of production necessary for the effective conduct of the war.”188 The Board
increased in popularity up until the end of the war, at which time employers began
to lose interest in mediating disputes.189
Employers’ waning interest in mediation boiled down to supply-and-demand
considerations.190 The less production that occurred, the less demand for labor and
the less need to keep employees disciplined (in terms of keeping them from
striking).191 Employer concerns about strikes also dissipated because labor supply
(and therefore a greater supply of workers to replace strikers) naturally increased as
war soldiers returned home. With less need for quicker, informal grievance
resolution processes, the Board met for the last time on August 12, 1919, at which
time it dissolved.192
During World War II, however, by Executive Order,193 President Franklin D.
Roosevelt reinstated the National War Labor Board, as a tripartite tribunal of twelve
commissioners (four from labor, four from industry, and four to represent the
public).194 The Board had jurisdiction over “labor disputes which might interrupt
work which contributes to the effective prosecution of the war,” and would resolve
those disputes through “mediation, voluntary arbitration, or arbitration under rules
established by the Board.”195 Congress, through the War Labor Disputes Act,196
required “a public hearing on the merits of the dispute,”197 which further formalized
these processes and strengthened the War Labor Board. However, Congress also
disempowered workers by removing the employees’ right to withdraw their labor
(strike), absent “not less than thirty days” notice to the Secretary of Labor, the
National War Labor Board, and the National Labor Relations Board (along with an
NLRB-conducted, secret-ballot strike vote of the membership).198 Congress also
authorized the President to seize private industrial plants where a strike or other labor

187

See id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
189
Id. at 48–51.
190
See id. at 50.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 51–52.
193
Exec. Order No. 9017, 7 FED. REG. 237, 237–38 (Jan. 14, 1942) (superseding the
National Defense Mediation Board, created by Exec. Order 8716, 6 FED. REG. 1532 (Mar.
19, 1941)).
194
Freidin & Ulman, supra note 185, at 313.
195
Exec. Order No. 9017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237, 237 (Jan. 14, 1942).
196
War Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act, Pub. L. No. 78-89, 57 Stat. 163–169
(1943).
197
Id. § 7(a)(1).
198
Id. § 8(a)(1)–(2).
188
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disturbance was imminent.199 By its own terms, the Act expired “at the end of six
months following the termination of hostilities in the present war . . . or [earlier if
by congressional amendment].”200
The War Labor Boards of 1918–19 and 1943–46 tangibly linked industrial
peace with curtailed strike rights and enhanced grievance-arbitration proceedings to
resolve disputes.201 Congress additionally formalized this link in the immediate
aftermath of World War II. Against a backdrop of post-war industrial strife202 and
the popular narrative that unions had grown too strong, Congress passed the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act),203 which both restricted
secondary activity, such as secondary strikes,204 and created the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service.205
A flurry of wildcat strikes—strikes that are not authorized by a union—between
late 1945 and 1946 similarly bolstered the message that because unions had grown
too strong, employers needed to couple strike curtailment with quick resolution of
workplace disputes.206 Harvard scholars, Jerome F. Scott and George C. Homans,
performed contemporaneous, preliminary research on wildcat strikes in Detroit.207
They explored the phenomenon of wildcat strikes by asking the question why some
workers did not strike.208 According to Scott and Homans, social frustration, fatigue,
and the economic power to insist on demands could not, by themselves, explain the
number of wildcat strikes toward the end of the war, because many other workers,
who were under the same conditions of frustration, and fatigue, and equally
empowered, also refused to strike. 209

199

Id. § 3.
Id. § 10.
201
See generally Ronald W. Schatz, “Industrial Peace through Arbitration”: George
Taylor and the Genius of the War Labor Board, 11 LAB. 39, 42, 48 (2014); Gregg, supra
note 186, at 39–42, 59–61.
202
See generally Barton J. Bernstein, The Truman Administration and the Steel Strike
of 1946, 52 J. AM. HIST. 791 (1966) (detailing how the post-war Truman administration was
faced with and dealt with reconversion, inflation, and various strikes across industries).
203
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, (1947).
204
See id. § 8(b)(4) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)).
205
See id. § 202(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 172(a)). See generally David
E. Feller, Symposium, Taft and Hartley Vindicated: The Curious History of Review of Labor
Arbitration Awards, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 296 (1998) (detailing the history of
labor arbitration following the Taft-Hartley Act); Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and
Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 (1955).
206
See Jerome F. Scott & George C. Homans, Reflections on the Wildcat Strikes, 12
AM. SOCIO. REV. 278, 280 (1947).
207
See id.
208
See id. at 285.
209
Id. at 279–81.
200
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Interestingly, immediately after the war, Scott and Homans concluded that “a
number of strikes seemed to stem from faulty communication.”210 The researchers
observed a similar communication breakdown on management’s side. They further
noted that the War Labor Board might have contributed to this faulty communication
by creating delay in the process.211 In short, lines of communication among the main
players—workers, management, and government—were growing longer and more
indirect, while lines of communication within particular groups—especially
workers—were solidifying thereby making wildcat strikes more likely to occur.212
In contrast, in workplaces where few wildcat strikes occurred, the researchers
observed well-developed communication channels.213 Management promptly
responded to workers’ complaints, and union representatives and managers dealt
directly and honestly with each other.214 Interestingly, the parties managed their
disputes using plant workers—insiders, not outsiders.215 This atypical model stands
in contrast to the norm of a legalistic culture in which workers and managers would
dig into their positions based on rights instead of working together to find creative
solutions.216
Notwithstanding the connection between industrial peace and grievancearbitration, no one seemed to think that employees could waive their statutory right
to strike absent an express agreement to do so.217 Indeed, in 1951, famed labor
scholar Archibald Cox explained that express grievance clauses imposed at most an
“implied commitment” by “each party” to refrain from “economic pressure until the
[grievance] procedure has been exhausted.”218 He added that “[a] ‘no strike’ clause

210

Id. (“Workingmen would call it the ‘runaround.’ They use that phrase when they
feel that what they consider important is not in fact being treated as such by people in
authority. . . . [C]ommunication is concerned with action, not with abstract understanding.
Action may not be taken, but unless the man at the bottom feels that a responsible individual
has given serious consideration to his concerns, communication, for him, has failed. Wartime
conditions made communications . . . much more difficult, while they made workingmen
much more ready to insist . . . that communication be improved.”).
211
Id. (“With all its good intentions, the War Labor Board may have hurt
communication more than it helped. Here was an organization outside the industry. Disputes
referred to it meant longer delays before responsible action was taken. Rightly or wrongly,
workers often felt that companies had used the War Labor Board to stall and to avoid dealing
with matters which could perfectly well have been handled on the spot.”).
212
See id. at 281–83. “[T]he feeling of the work[er] that he was at last in a position to
insist on being heard became strong at a time when the actual avenues of communication,
both for the company and the union, became weaker and more indirect than they had been in
the past.” Id. at 282.
213
See id. at 286.
214
See id.
215
See id.
216
See id. at 285.
217
See Archibald Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L. J. 319,
330 (1951).
218
Id. at 329.
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is the subject of considerable deliberation during contract negotiations and is often
a concession for which the union exacts a substantial price from the employer.”219
Yet in a series of later-decided cases, the Supreme Court held precisely that
unions and employees may waive the right to strike simply by agreeing to arbitrate
a dispute, even in the absence of a no-strike promise.220 First, in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, the Court declared that “[p]lainly the agreement to arbitrate
grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike.”221 Then, in
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., the Supreme Court held that an express arbitration
clause in a collective-bargaining agreement created an implied duty not to strike
over disputes subject to arbitration, notwithstanding the lack of a no-strike promise
in that very same contract.222 Judicial attitudes strongly in favor of forced arbitration
in the union context culminated most recently in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, where
the Supreme Court held that a union and employer can agree to waive employees’
rights to litigate age discrimination claims simply by agreeing to arbitrate those
claims.223
2. Development of Forced Arbitration in the Nonunion Workplace
There are many good reasons to favor some form of ADR in the nonunion
workplace. Foremost, most workers are employed at-will.224 An employer who
provides ADR is providing at least some due process, which serves to dignify
workers and give those workers some say in decisions affecting their jobs.225 “Fair
arbitral procedures can provide a more expeditious and less expensive alternative
that may benefit workers more than judicial proceedings.”226 “In a world without
employment arbitration as an available option, we would essentially have a
‘cadillac’ system for the few and a ‘rickshaw’ system for the many.”227

219

Id. at 330.
Analysis of the question whether a pro-business tilt on the court is responsible for
these results is beyond the scope of this paper. For such an analysis, see Epstein et al., supra
note 172; LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013).
221
353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
222
369 U.S. 95, 104–05 (1962).
223
556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009).
224
See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 8 (1993) (stating that most U.S. American workers
have no legal recourse when fired).
225
See Lofaso, supra note 96, at 57.
226
Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures to Resolve Employment
Discrimination Claims, 11 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 158 (2001).
227
Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001).
220
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But why do employers prefer mandatory arbitration?228 And why, at the same
time when employers have increasingly favored mandatory arbitration, have some
companies chosen to use trained peer or employee advocates in resolving workplace
disputes?229 To answer these questions, it is helpful to examine the reasons that
employers have given for favoring mandatory arbitration of workplace disputes.
In addition to business reasons,230 employers who favor mandatory arbitration
claim that arbitration is cost-effective for all players—employers, employees, and
the public; also, resolution is speedy231 and the results are fair.232 One of the most
common reasons for employers to favor mandatory arbitration is that increase in
employment discrimination cases and other wrongful discharge cases that has
clogged court dockets and has cost industries billions in annual litigation
expenses.233 However, the data reveal a different story. According to the Equal
228

See Eisenberg et al., supra note 6, at 122–23 (suggesting two employer motives—
to prevent consumers from aggregating claims into class actions and to avoid jury trials in
both consumer and employment disputes).
229
See Ann G. Leibowitz, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Gilmer
Threw Polaroid a Curve, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 49TH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Samuel Estreicher ed. 1997). Polaroid employed four professional
ombudsmen, trained in dispute resolution and who reported directly to the Chief Executive
Officer. The ombudsmen had investigatory, fact-finding, and advisory powers. Id. at 152.
Polaroid further trained sixty employees in mediation of employment disputes. Id. at 153.
See Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 753, 754–55 (1990). For descriptions of peer-review grievance boards, see EWING,
supra note 2, at 185–203 (discussing procedures at the Control Data Corporation); id. at 223–
40 (discussing procedures at the Federal Express Corporation); Fred C. Olson, How Peer
Review Works at Control Data, 62 HARV. BUS. REV. 58, 58 (1984) (discussing procedures
at Control Data).
230
Ms. Liebowitz provides the following three business reasons for favoring arbitration
of employment disputes: (1) Arbitration provides a means for monitoring supervisory
application of managerial policies; (2) arbitration can alert management to underlying or
systemic organizational problems that might otherwise go undetected; (3) arbitration
provides an incentive to managers, whose performance often depends on maintaining morale,
to resolve disputes at the lowest possible level. See Leibowitz, supra note 229. Liebowitz
also mentions that some employers use grievance-arbitration dispute resolution to discourage
unionization. Id. at 149–50.
231
Proponents of forced arbitration point out that forced arbitration enables parties to a
workplace dispute to resolve their conflicts speedily because, unlike jury trials, arbitration is
not plagued with endless motions and delay tactics. Cf. Who Wins in Supreme Court’s
Arbitration Ruling, CNN (Mar. 23, 2001), https://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/03/23/scotus.
arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/H54V-NHTH]; Lorber: Arbitration Good for Companies and
Workers, CNN (Mar. 23, 2001), https://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/03/23/scotus.arbitration.
lorber/ [https://perma.cc/37QH-NP9S].
232
See Eisenberg et al., supra note 6, at 119.
233
See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 189 (1997) (“Proponents argue that [employment]
arbitration will provide an expeditious, low cost means for employees to get a hearing on
statutory, contractual, or other claims arising out of their dismissal.”).
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Employment Opportunity Commission, charges filed in employment discrimination
cases have remained constant between 1997 and 2007, averaging 79,782 charges
during that ten-year period.234 The year 2008 witnessed a jump in charges filed,
followed by a eight-year plateau from 2008 to 2016 averaging 94,594 charges.235
Between 2013 and 2016, charges remained steady between 93,727 and 88,778.236 In
2017, charges plummeted to 84,254; the downward trend continued through 2020
with charges at 67,448.237 The last three years for which we have data show a steady
decline in charges filed from 76,418 filed in 2018 to 61,331 filed in 2021.238 The
result is an overall decrease in charges filed over the last quarter century.239
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A more accurate narrative of the past quarter-century might be two-fold. After
a period of stasis, EEOC complaints rose during the Obama years, when workers
might have become more aware of their rights and believed, together with their
attorneys, that the Administration and a more diverse judiciary would be more
sympathetic to discrimination claims.
234

See EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 1.
Id.
236
See id.
237
See id.
238
See id.
239
For earlier studies questioning the litigation-explosion myth, see generally Marc
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Theodore
Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions About the Federal Court System,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1989) (examining the causes for these different perceptions).
235
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Two significant changes in the legal landscape, however, tempered this uptick
in charges filed.240 First, and most significantly, is the Supreme Court’s decision in
Epic Systems v. Lewis, which compels arbitration and waives litigation of many
employment-discrimination claims.241 Second, and more difficult to assess, is the
demise of notice pleading242 and the advent of plausibility pleading243 in federal civil
litigation. Under this relatively new pleading standard, a complaint must contain
enough facts to raise “a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
of [unlawful conduct].”244 Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”245 In adopting the “plausibility standard,” the Court expressly
disavowed “as best forgotten”246 the “no set of facts” language set forth in Conley v.
Gibson,247 which had governed pleading standards for fifty years.
Another common reason employers give for favoring arbitration is that
arbitration yields fair results. To assess this claim, it is useful to compare arbitration
to litigation.248
Almost fifty years ago, Professor Marc Galanter examined the advantages that
repeat players (“RP”)—“who are engaged in many similar litigations over time”—
have in litigation over one-shotters (“OS”)—“claimants who have only occasional
recourse to the courts.”249 After carefully noting that the RP-OS is not a dichotomous
pair but a continuum,250 Professor Galanter describes the ideal RP as “a unit which
has had and anticipates repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the outcome of
any one case, and which has the resources to pursue its long-run interests,” and the
ideal OS as “a unit whose claims are too large (relative to his size) or too small

240
Consideration of other mitigating solutions, such as making the judicialconfirmation process more efficient and less political, are beyond the scope of this Article.
241
See 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619, 1632 (2018).
242
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957).
243
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 557–64 (2007). The graph could be read as discouraging EEOC filings as early
as 2012, which would suggest a possible causal relationship between Iqbal/Twombly and the
likelihood of employment-discrimination litigation.
244
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
245
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s
liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to
relief.”’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 556, 557)).
246
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
247
355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957).
248
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 95 n.1 (1974).
249
Id. at 97.
250
Id. at 97–98.
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(relative to the cost of remedies) to be managed routinely and rationally.”251 Good
present-day examples of the idealized RP are large corporate employers, such as
Wal-Mart or Amazon. The discharged employee is an excellent example of the
idealized OP. Significantly, RPs have the following characteristics that OSs do not
possess: (1) advanced intelligence, having engaged repeatedly in similar litigations;
(2) expertise, access to specialists, economies of scale, and therefore low start-up
costs in any case; (3) “opportunities to develop facilitative informal relations with
institutional incumbents;” (4) interest in preserving a bargaining reputation as a
combatant; (5) capacity to play the odds and to adopt minimax strategies (minimize
the possibility of maximum loss); (6) capacity to choose to play for substantive-rule
changing, procedural-rule changing, or for gain.252
Devising a rubric of the four possible litigation pairs—OS v. OS, RP v. OS, OS
v. RP, RP v. RP—Galanter concluded that “the great bulk of litigation is found”
when an RP-plaintiff sues an OS-defendant.253 By contrast, litigation between an
OS-plaintiff and an RP-defendant is unusual outside of personal injury cases,
wrongful discharge lawsuits, and canceled franchise agreements.254 Employment
disputes also arise in the RP v. RP scenario, for example, in which a union sues a
corporation (or vice versa), or when the government sues a corporate employer on
behalf of a discharged employee.
According to Galanter, RPs have a stake in the rules themselves and how they
are applied in litigation and adjudication. Accordingly, it is expected for
. . . RPs to “settle” cases where they expected unfavorable rule outcomes.
Since they expect to litigate again, RPs can select to adjudicate (or appeal)
those cases which they regard as most likely to produce favorable rules.
On the other hand, OSs should be willing to trade off the possibility of
making “good law” for tangible gain. Thus, we would expect the body of
“precedent” cases—that is, cases capable of influencing the outcome of
future cases—to be relatively skewed toward those favorable to RP.255
Assuming Galanter is correct that precedent-setting cases are likely to be
skewed in favor of RPs, the question becomes: how does this behavior play out in
an arbitration setting? The answer often turns on whether the workplace is union or
nonunion.
In a union setting, RPs are suing RPs; therefore, neither player has a particular
advantage in selecting precedential cases or in currying favor with institutional legal
officials, i.e., arbitrators. The situation is vastly different in the case of nonunion
arbitration. Noting that arbitration decisions often become the “rule of the shop,”
employer-RPs can make rule changes more quickly than in litigation settings.
251

Id. at 98.
Id. at 98–101.
253
Id. at 108–09.
254
Id. at 110.
255
Id. at 101–02.
252
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Indeed, in arbitration, there is no public oversight, so employer-RPs can change the
rules governing a workplace in a matter of years. Even with the advantages that RPs
might have in litigation, such changes, if they come at all, come over decades of
planned litigation. Simply put, if Galanter is correct, then litigation, which is flawed
and tends to favor RPs, is still a much fairer system than arbitration, at least in the
nonunion setting. If correct, then OS-employees who have meritorious claims have
much to fear from arbitrating those claims against RP-employers.256
While employers may not admit it, one reason for favoring mandatory
arbitration is to avoid jury trials.257 Employers choose arbitration because it allows
them to, in effect, privatize the court system and avoid public exposure.258 At least
one study has shown that mandatory arbitration clauses for employment disputes
tend to incorporate jury waivers as well.259 However, the study also reveals that the
very same businesses that favor mandatory arbitration and jury waivers for
employment disputes do not favor such procedures for business-to-business
disputes, suggesting that businesses have a different motive.260
Revisiting Getman’s rubric—finality, obedience, guidance, efficiency,
availability, neutrality, conflict reduction, and fairness261—when arbitration
functions properly, it is more efficient and less costly than litigation. These qualities
make arbitration more available to the average American. To the extent that
arbitration, especially in conjunction with mediation, can be utilized prior to
discharge, this form of internal dispute resolution has a greater likelihood of conflict
reduction than does litigation. Arbitration is also relatively final because court
review of arbitration decisions is tightly circumscribed.262 This means that if an
employer refuses to obey an arbitration decision to reinstate a discharged employee,
the employee can relatively quickly get court review of the arbitrator’s decision.
256
It is difficult to assess the circumstances under which the wrongfully discharged
employee with the meritorious claim is more disadvantaged. Some employers might prefer
litigation to stall a meritorious employee claim. Iqbal’s plausibility pleading standard—
particularly in employment discrimination cases where the employer tends to enjoy greater
power and sole access to the relevant information—makes it harder for an employee with a
meritorious claim to get to discovery.
257
Bingham, supra note 233, at 190 (“[E]mployers likely will benefit from the
elimination of the outlier jury award, concerns over which have motivated substantial
changes in personnel practices, at some significant cost.”).
258
See Cheryl Wilke, New Frontier for Employers, in EMPLOYMENT LAW 2012: TOP
LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR, 2012 WL 697226
(2012).
259
See Eisenberg et al., supra note 6, at 122.
260
See id.
261
Getman, supra note 113, at 916.
262
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). For an
explanation of these precedent-setting cases, known as the Steelworkers Trilogy, see Anne
Marie Lofaso, Deflategate: What’s the Steelworkers Trilogy Got to Do with It?, 6 BERK. J.
ENT. & SPORTS L. 50, 63–70 (2017).
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Nevertheless, arbitration falters in at least three categories—neutrality,
guidance, and fairness. First, as explained above, in the case of OS-employee v. RPemployer litigation, the RP has the capacity to critically influence the rules and
outcomes. RP-employer “opportunities to develop facilitative informal relations
with institutional incumbents,”263 such as arbitrators, suggests that, at least in the
nonunion setting, arbitration may not provide neutral decision makers.264 Second,
arbitral decisions may provide an opportunity for RP-employers to influence the
rules that govern arbitrations but at least in the nonunion setting this guidance inures
primarily to the benefit of the RP-employer, who has a stake in the rules and who is
helping to shape those rules.265 Arbitrators have no requirement to produce a written
record or opinion,266 and arbitration decisions have virtually no precedential
value.267 To be sure, OS-employees also may not pay much attention to court
precedents, even though court precedents are less likely to change, and apply to a
larger group of people than arbitration decisions (which typically apply only to the
employer whose case was arbitrated).268 Third, the very fact that arbitrations are
more efficient also increase the likelihood that arbitrations are unfair, because there
are fewer procedural safeguards for claimants. Litigation, on the contrary, has
mistake-correction procedures built into its entire process. Indeed, final orders of
federal claims and most state claims are entitled to at least one appeal.269 In contrast,
appeals of arbitrators’ decisions are constrained.270 Under the Federal Arbitration
Act, parties are allowed only limited judicial review of an arbitration award and
virtually no review of the substantive merits of the award.271
Arbitration as currently practiced too often mutates into a private judicial
system that can look and cost like the litigation it is supposed to prevent. However,
companies that have developed more comprehensive internal dispute-resolution

263

Galanter, supra note 248, at 98–101.
Ralph G. Wellington, Is a Neutral Party-Appointed Arbitrator an Oxymoron?, 27
ABA: DISP. RESOL. MAG. 34 (2021).
265
Galanter, supra note 248, at 98–101.
266
Decision & Award, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/decisionaward [https://perma.cc/3R6C-KZ4U] (last visited July 2, 2022).
267
TERENCE LAU, THE LEGAL & ETHICAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS § 4.3 (2011),
https://cap-press.com/books/isbn/9781531018528/Modern-Labor-Law-in-the-Private-andPublic-Sectors-Third-Edition [https://perma.cc/SLR2-XESM] (last visited July 2, 2022).
268
Galanter, supra note 248, at 102 (discussing the OS-employee’s willingness to trade
precedent for “tangible gain”).
269
FED. R. APP. P. 4.
270
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–85
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596–599
(1960).
271
See generally Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008);
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Are Discriminatory and Unfair, PUB. CITIZEN,
https://www.citizen.org/article/mandatory-arbitration-clauses-are-discriminatory-andunfair/ [https://perma.cc/ZXS8-5D3G] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022).
264
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procedures, such as peer-centric grievance systems, have preserved the original
ideals of efficiency and fairness that alternative dispute resolution espouses.
III. PEER ADVOCACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Employee committees utilizing peer advocates are a type of alternative disputeresolution system whereby employees represent co-workers who bring their
concerns to management.272 Peer review comprises “[a] panel of employees (or
employees and managers) who review the evidence and listen to the parties’
arguments to decide an issue in dispute. Peer review panel members are trained in
the handling of sensitive issues. The panel’s decision may or may not be binding on
the parties.”273 Below is a description of three such programs: (A) Polaroid’s
Employee Committee, which utilized peer advocates; (B) General Electric’s Peer
Review Program; and (C) Kansas State University, which also utilizes peer
advocates.
A. Polaroid: A Case Study in Using Peer Advocates to Represent Employees in
Internal Grievance Procedures
1. Overview: Formation of the Oldest Nonunion System of Industrial Democracy
in the United States
The Polaroid Corporation is a former Fortune 500 company in the camera and
optics business,274 which rose to fame and success in the postwar era under the
leadership of its founder, Dr. Edwin Land.275 Dr. Land had two goals for his
company’s employee relations atmosphere. The first dealt with his vision for
Polaroid’s financial success through innovation by making “products of the highest
quality at reasonable cost,” which were “genuinely new and useful to the public.”276
272

U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS’
EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE (1997).
273
Id.
274
Between 1959 and 1995, Polaroid continually remained on the Fortune 500 list,
reaching a rank of 203 in 1992. Fortune500, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines
/fortune/fortune500_archive/letters/P.html [https://perma.cc/6382-BMHH] (last visited Feb.
6, 2022); Fortune500: Polaroid, CNN MONEY, https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune500_archive/snapshots/1992/1067.html
[https://perma.cc/LZ9K-XMQB]
(last
visited July 26, 2022).
275
See generally MILTON P. DENTCH, FALL OF AN ICON: POLAROID AFTER EDWIN H.
LAND (AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE ONCE GREAT COMPANY) (Carol Chubb ed., 2012). Dr.
Land founded Polaroid in 1937. Id. at 5. He resigned as Chairman in 1980. Id. at 254–56.
Polaroid filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2001. Id. at 85. In the interest of fairness, Richard
Kriebel, who came to Polaroid in 1936 as Director of Public Relations, is credited for having
implemented Dr. Land’s personnel vision. Id. at 5. The literature suggests that Polaroid’s
peer advocacy program was as much Kriebel’s idea as it was Dr. Land’s. Id.
276
Id.
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The second, which was radically progressive for its time, was that all employees—
managers, supervisors, and rank-and-file—should be treated with dignity:
[E]veryone working for Polaroid [was to have] personal opportunity with
the company for full exercise of his talents; to express his opinions, to
share in the progress of the Company as far as his capacities permit, to
earn enough money so that the need for earning more will not always be
the first thing on his mind—opportunity, in short, to make his work here
a fully rewarding, important part of his life.277
Dr. Land’s search for a dignified workplace culminated in the Polaroid
Employees Committee (“EC”). Formed in 1946, Polaroid’s EC is the United States’
oldest nonunion industrial due-process system.278 The EC consisted of several
members, drawing from a pool of employees with full-time jobs in nonsupervisory
hourly and salaried positions, such as mechanics, maintenance workers, machine
operators, financial analysts, research and development technicians, and modelmakers.279 These employee representatives, also called peer advocates, were elected
by their co-workers to “sp[eak] for employees” on matters concerning the firm and
employee welfare in “discussions” with firm management.280 The EC Chairman was
as powerful as any top manager, and the Chairman had direct access to Dr. Land,281
who himself viewed the EC as a “natural outgrowth of my relationship with Polaroid
employees at the time.”282
As far as EC peer advocates represented employees in labor-management
discussions, particularly in discussions over cost-of-living increases and disciplinary
proceedings,283 the EC functioned as a union. However, while labor-management
relations in an ordinary unionized shop were often characterized as antagonistic and
based on opposing interests, Polaroid’s EC attempted to cultivate a high trust and
cooperative environment.

277

Id.
See EWING, supra note 2, at 299 (citing Northrop as having formed a similar system
of due process also in 1946).
279
Id. at 303.
280
See Polaroid Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. 424, 426 (1999).
281
See Ann Leibowitz, Another Insider’s View, in DENTCH, supra note 275, at 11.
282
See EWING, supra note 2, at 299.
283
When, in 1993, Polaroid reconstituted the EC into the Employee-Owners Influence
Council (EOIC) to avoid labor prosecution, the EOIC continued discussions with
management over money, including Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) funds,
disciplinary proceedings, medical benefits, and time off for family and medical reasons. See
Polaroid Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. at 426–27.
278
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2. Polaroid’s Disciplinary Process
Polaroid’s progressive disciplinary process resembled the standard disciplinary
system typical of a unionized shop, despite a lack of clear contractual language.284
Instead, grievance claims could be based on Polaroid’s Personnel Policy Manual.285
The progressive steps included a verbal warning,286 a first written warning, a second
written warning, a warning in lieu of termination, and a termination notice.287
3. Polaroid’s Grievance Process
Polaroid’s multi-step grievance process also resembled the standard grievancearbitration mechanism of union shops, despite the lack of contractual language.288
As with typical modern grievance mechanisms, Polaroid sported an informal pregrievance step, whereby employees were encouraged to discuss concerns with their
supervisor before filing a grievance.289 When a Polaroid employee was dissatisfied
with or concerned about a work issue, he290 would talk to his rep.291 The employee
representative (rep) would “guide [the employee] a little. He might cite some past
cases that are similar to yours so that you can decide better whether to press on. But
whatever you decide, he represents you. It doesn’t matter if he personally thinks
you’re way off base. If you say, ‘I want to grieve,’ then we grieve.”292
Although Polaroid’s informal pre-grievance conversations were remarkably
like those that take place in the union workplace, the next steps demonstrate the
uniqueness of Polaroids process. Before filing a grievance, the rep would approach
the general supervisor himself, with or without the grievant, to see if they could
resolve the issue.293 If the conversation between the rep and the general supervisor
were unsuccessful, the rep would then go to the division manager.294 Only if the
grievant and rep remained unsatisfied with the division manager’s response would
the rep file the grievance.295
284

EWING, supra note 2, at 300–01.
See Polaroid Personnel Policy Manual No. 410 (2020).
286
The verbal warning was reduced to writing for purposes of documenting the concern
for purposes of the grievance process. Id.
287
Id.
288
See EWING, supra note 2, at 300 (quotation omitted).
289
Id.
290
We use a gendered pronoun here to recognize the fact that the workplace was
overwhelmingly male at the time in question.
291
EWING, supra note 2, at 300 (“‘Did you talk about this with your supervisor?’ If you
didn’t, he’ll ask you to go back and do that before he’ll talk with you. When you do talk with
him, he wants to understand your problem. He doesn’t judge whether you’re right or wrong;
he just wants to be able to represent your point of view.”).
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
Id.
295
Id.
285
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As described by the EC Vice Chair, Polaroid’s grievance process resembled a
three-step grievance process typical of a union shop, with a penultimate internal
appeal to Polaroid’s president and an ultimate appeal to outside arbitration.296 First,
a formal grievance would be filed with the department manager and others involved
in the case.297 Second, if the grievant remained unsatisfied with the result, a formal
grievance could be filed with the division officer.298 Finally, if the grievant remained
unsatisfied, a Personnel Policy Committee would convene, and a panel of three
corporate officers would hear the case.299 Both the grievant and managers would
have the opportunity to present their case, and the panel would be permitted to ask
questions.300 The panel would then issue its decision in writing, which was
appealable to the company President.301 If still unsatisfied with the President’s
decision, the grievant could request outside arbitration subject to the company’s
authorization.302 If the company permitted the grievance to proceed to arbitration,
the company would pay for an arbitrator jointly picked by the company and the
Employees Committee.303 The grievant could hire an attorney for the arbitration.304
The following chart summarizes Polaroid’s grievance process and compares it
with the typical union-shop grievance process.
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Comparison of Grievance Mechanisms
Polaroid
Union305
Representatives
Elected
Elected
Discipline based on . . . Personnel Policy
Collective-bargaining
Agreement
Notice Prior to
Progressive Discipline Progressive Discipline
Discharge?
Pre-grievance steps?
Encouraged to talk to Many organized workforces
supervisor before
encourage some prefiling grievance
grievance dispute resolution
Is the grievance
Three steps with the
Typically
process multi-tiered?
possibility of bringing
the grievance to the
president himself as a
fourth step
With whom is
Lowest level
Lowest level supervisor
grievance filed?
supervisor
Representative during
Employee rep a.k.a.
Shop steward or
grievance process?
Peer Advocate
another union rep
Who decides whether
The Company
The Union
the grievance goes to
arbitration?
Who pays for
The Company
Negotiated; usually some
arbitration?
form of joint payment or
cost shifted to loser
Who selects arbitrator? Company and EC
Company and Union jointly
jointly
Polaroid’s grievance process worked well for at least five reasons. First, EC
reps were well trained and competent, which thereby promoted three values
considered significant for a successful dispute-resolution system under Professor
Getman’s rubric—efficiency, conflict reduction, and fairness.306 Polaroid trained
and paid as many as thirty-two employee reps, whose full-time job was to serve on
the EC to decide grievances.307 Training was done on the job. The more experienced
EC reps, known as coordinators, trained or coached the newly elected EC reps.308
Management also developed a training program for the reps: “The teachers [were]
brought in from outside the company, but the subject matter [was] carefully worked
out by [senior members of the employee committee]. It cover[ed] such topics as the
305
For a description of the typical union-grievance process, see SETH D. HARRIS,
JOSEPH E. SLATER, ANNE MARIE LOFASO, CHARLOTTE GARDEN & RICHARD F. GRIFFIN, JR.,
MODERN LABOR LAW IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS 1071–73 (3d ed. 2021).
306
Getman, supra note 113, at 916. See also EWING, supra note 2, at 300–02.
307
See EWING, supra note 2, at 302.
308
See id. at 303.
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nature of power and influence, negotiation skills, and effective presentation of facts
and arguments.”309
Second, the EC promoted democratic values, which in turn promoted Getman’s
value of fairness.310 EC reps were elected by ballot to serve two-year terms,
renewable by re-election.311 At election time, “the candidates . . . c[a]me around and
talk[ed] to you at your work. They [told] you what they want[ed] to do if elected.”312
Third, the EC was visible, which promoted Getman’s value of availability.313
EC reps tended to possess excellent communication skills and therefore could
promote the process to their co-worker constituents.314 And the general system of
dispute resolution was widely publicized.
Fourth, Polaroid’s work culture promoted dignity and supported a grievance
mechanism run by peer advocates, which in turn promoted a high-trust environment
between labor and management.315 Such an environment was likely to promote
Getman’s value of conflict reduction and fairness.316 Even the most senior managers
held EC reps in high esteem.317 EC reps were proud of their positions in the
company.318
Fifth, the process held supervisors and managers accountable, which promoted
Getman’s values of finality.319 The ultimate step before arbitration was the president
himself.320 This meant that all supervisors and managers were answerable for their
actions to the president. Such accountability is a powerful deterrent for settling
meritorious claims. “The fact that [managers] are held accountable by having their
actions and decisions subject to open review and debate has an astonishingly strong
tendency to keep them honest and prevent abuses of discretion.”321 Related to points
four and five regarding dignity and accountability, Polaroid’s management
promoted a culture that viewed employee involvement as consistent with (and as
even enhancing) Polaroid’s mission and one that encouraged management
introspection.322 Such introspection also corresponds to Professor Getman’s values
of obedience, guidance, and neutrality.
309
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Getman, supra note 113, at 916; EWING, supra note 2, at 299.
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EWING, supra note 2, at 302.
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Getman, supra note 113, at 916; EWING, supra note 2, at 300.
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See EWING, supra note 2, at 301, 302–03; cf. id. at 304–06.
315
Id.
316
See Getman, supra note 113, at 916.
317
EWING, supra note 2, at 302.
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Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Ann Leibowitz, former Senior Labor
Counsel, Polaroid Corp. (May 12, 2014) (notes on file with the author).
319
See Getman, supra note 113, at 922–23.
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EWING, supra note 2, at 300–01.
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See EWING, supra note 2, at 8 (quoting Ann Leibowitz, Senior Legal Counsel for
Polaroid) (quotations omitted).
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See id. at 307 (“I.M. Booth, Polaroid’s Chief Executive Officer, is said to feel
strongly that the Employees Committee provides insights that it would be difficult for
management to gain otherwise.”).
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4. Tangible Successes of the EC Committee
Polaroid’s EC achieved success in three major ways. First, managers believed
that the Committee saved the jobs of many good workers, who would have left but
for the Committee’s efforts.323 Indeed, employee turnover was exceptionally low.324
And with low turnover comes less costs incurred in training new employees. Second,
the EC provided useful insights to management about personnel and other issues.325
One supervisor related the following story: “Years ago when I was a supervisor . . .
several [peer advocates] came to me confidentially and gave me some very good
advice on how to be a better supervisor. It was the kind of advice you are lucky to
get from a good boss.”326 Similarly, another manager commented: “In its role in
dispute resolution as well as in its other functions, the committee seems to . . . bring
a fresh perspective, a new dimension to operations. It is as if the organization’s
thought processes were expanded, its collective brain enlarged.”327
Third, very few grievances ended in arbitration.328 Employees seemed to be
happy that their disputes were heard and that their concerns received a fair hearing,
regardless of the outcome. Satisfaction with the process’s fairness seemed to be
sufficient to deter arbitration and litigation.329
In summary, expressly assessing Polaroid’s EC program in terms of Professor
Getman’s rubric shows that it was destined for success.330
Value
Finality. Once decided, are cases
likely to be retried or appealed?
Obedience. Are the decisions put into
effect or are they rendered
meaningless by subsequent refusals to
carry them out?
Guidance. Do the decisions provide
necessary guidance to the parties
involved in the dispute? Can they
subsequently structure behavior in a
323

Assessment
The ultimate appeal to the President of
Polaroid ensured finality of the
process.331
Inherent to this model was that
managers were introspective about the
results, suggesting that they
implemented decisions.332
It yielded decisions that provided
guidance to the parties by “bring[ing] a
fresh perspective, a new dimension to

Id. (“The Committee has saved lots of good employees’ jobs.”).
Id. (“The turnover among hourly paid employees is very low.”).
325
Id. at 302.
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Id.
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Id. at 308.
328
See Telephone Interview with Ann Leibowitz, former Senior Labor Counsel,
Polaroid Corp. (May 12, 2014) (notes on file with the author).
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Getman, supra note 113, at 916.
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See supra notes 301 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 319–322 and accompanying text.
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reasonable fashion and avoid future
litigation?
Efficiency. Are most disputes settled
without a formal hearing? When cases
are tried, are the procedures adequate,
flexible, and suited to the issue? Are
the benefits achieved from the system
economical compared to the costs?
Availability. Is the dispute-resolution
machinery routinely available without
undue expense to people whose
behavior is governed by the system,
and are they provided with adequate
representation?
Neutrality. Do the decision makers
avoid favoritism and bias for one side
or another?
Conflict Reduction. Does the entire
process, including the adjudication,
lead to more amicable relations and
contribute to mutual respect among the
potential disputants?
Fairness. Disputes resolved in a way
that recognizes the parties’ interests.
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operations,” thereby enlarging “its
collective brain.”333
Polaroid’s election system allowed
those who wanted to work as an
employee representative and advocate
for others to do so, thereby
maximizing the efficiency of obtaining
representation for grieving workers.334
Rank-and-file workers, those governed
by the system, also managed the
system. This flat hierarchy advanced
availability and transparency.335
Reps were trained by outside experts,
thereby promoting neutrality.336
Very few conflicts went to
arbitration.337

Managers were happy because of
efficiency and productivity savings.
Workers were satisfied because
someone listened to their concerns
with an open mind.338

B. General Electric: A Case Study in Peer Review
Peer review is a similar type of alternative dispute mechanism that has been
dubbed “the most cloned procedure for resolving complaints in U.S.
manufacturing—and possibly in all industry.”339 Indeed, several notable
333

See EWING, supra note 2, at 308.
See id. at 302.
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Id. at 303 (listing the kinds of employees who held positions on the Employees
Committee).
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Id. (“[T]eachers are brought in from outside the company.”).
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See id. at 302 (“[The Employees Committee representatives] try to screen out
nonsense and baseless complaints. They try to dissuade employees who don’t have legitimate
concerns.).
338
See id. at 307 (“[T]he Employees Committee appears to be a strong fixture in the
company . . . Polaroid’s Chief Executive Officer . . . is said to feel strongly that the
Employees Committee provides [positive] insights.”).
339
See EWING, supra note 2, at 241.
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corporations adopted a peer review system for employee grievances, with
remarkable success. In 1982, for example, managers for General Electric’s
Appliance Park-East facility in Columbia, Maryland,340 developed a peer-review
process as a union-avoidance technique and found that it succeeded in helping the
general corporation.341 In the words of one manager:
The [G.E. Park-East] plant had a long history of labor unrest and low
morale, and Harvey was determined to change the atmosphere. By talking
to employees Harvey learned that the major issues were not necessarily
pay and benefits, but instead revolved around the day[-]to[-]day activities
of the plant. The major concern of employees was the inconsistency with
which company rules and policies were applied.
Another main concern of employees was that there was no effective means
to air their grievances to management. The company’s Open Door Policy
was perceived to be nothing more than slow, ineffective, “rubber stamp”
system, therefore it was rarely used. In an effort to . . . improve consistency
and resolve employee disputes in a fair and timely manner [the personnel
manager] developed the Peer Review dispute resolution system.342
General Electric (“G.E.”) successfully implemented the peer-review program
at the Columbia, Maryland plant.343 Indeed, the plant remained nonunionized, and
G.E. reported heightened morale among its workers.344 The program was so
successful that G.E. implemented it in several other facilities across the country.345
General Electric initially organized peer review panels comprised of five
individuals—two
management
representatives
and
three
employee
representatives.346 Although there were no fixed rules for how many individuals
340

See Gary W. Williams & Brian H. Kleiner, Peer Review: Its Time Has Come, 2
TEAM PERFORMANCE MGMT. J. 21, 22 (1996); see also Margaret M. Clark, Making Peer
Review Work, SHRM (Jan. 1, 2005), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hrmagazine/pages/making-peer-review-work.aspx [https://perma.cc/4B9Q-3PUQ] (describing
the work of Caras and Associates, a “Maryland-based consulting firm that helps companies
install and administer peer review systems”); Margaret M. Clark, A Jury of Their Peers,
SHRM (Jan. 1, 2004), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/Pages/Jury-oftheir-Peers.aspx [https://perma.cc/B2QU-AAP5].
341
See EWING, supra note 2, at 243 (“Both employees and Management at the plant
[are] pleased with the results of the grievance procedure.”).
342
Our Company History, Caras & Assocs., https://web.archive.org/web/2019090121
2659/http://www.peerpanel.com/history.html [https://perma.cc/JV3H-CLX3] (last visited
Sept. 1, 2019) See also Williams & Kleiner, supra note 340, at 22 (describing the peer review
system at GE’s Maryland facility).
343
See EWING, supra note 2, at 241–44.
344
See id. at 241–51.
345
See id. at 250 (“The Columbia plant’s grievance procedure reportedly has been
adopted in eight other General Electric facilities.”).
346
See EWING, supra note 2, at 241.
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should serve on panels,347 they typically consisted of an odd number of members to
avoid deadlock.348 G.E. also structured panels so that the employee representatives
would outnumber the management representatives.349 When confronted by
managers who were skeptical about a process in which they were “outnumbered,”
G.E. manager, Joe Carando, responded, “[i]f we can’t convince at least one hourly
employee, maybe we’re wrong. . . . if the two managers see a case clearly . . . , they
should be able to persuade at least one other panelist and make it a 3–2 majority.”350
The panel reviews evidence, hears the parties’ arguments, and then decides the
disputed question. That decision may or may not be binding.351
C. Kansas State University: A Modern Example
Several universities and other workplaces familiar with group governance
utilize peer advocates in an internal grievance process. For example, Kansas State
University “[p]rovides all permanent university support staff the opportunity for a
fair hearing before an impartial panel of university support staff in unresolved
matters involving performance reviews, proposed suspension with pay (decisionmaking leaves) not involving discrimination . . . ; and claims of unfair treatment not
involving discrimination.”352
The peer review process at Kansas State occurs through a peer review
committee. Kansas State’s peer review committee is comprised of 21 members of
the University Support Staff (“USS”) that the Vice President of the University’s
Division of Human Capital Services appoints based on recommendations from the
USS Senate.353 Membership includes a demographic cross-section of USS
employees.354 To maintain their eligibility, committee members must participate in
a yearly training and are prohibited from engaging in any form of communication
347

See id. at 247–48 (explaining the subjective and open-ended rules that govern the

panel).

348

Id. at 241 (noting that the panel consists of “two salaried employees and three hourly
paid employees.”).
349
Id. at 242.
350
Id.
351
See generally Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems
Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 11, 41 (2005) (examining
how recent reforms in workplace arbitration impacts democratic accountability in open
workplaces).
352
See Human Capital Services: University Support Staff Grievances, KAN. STATE
UNIV.,
https://www.k-state.edu/hcs/employee-relations/disciplinary-actions/hearingsgrievances/uss.html#:~:text=University%20Support%20Staff%20Peer%20Review%20Co
mmittee%20Hearing%20Process%3A,treatment%20not%20involving%20discrimination%
20under%20PPM%20Chapter%203010 [http://perma.cc/E94L-UDB3] (last visited June 25,
2022).
353
University Support Staff Peer Review Committee Hearing Process, KAN. STATE
UNIV., https://www.k-state.edu/policies/ppm/4000/4030.html [https://perma.cc/ZXR4RASW] (last visited June 25, 2022).
354
See id.
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regarding the hearing with either the employee or the responding department any
time prior to the actual hearing.355 Typically, neither party has legal counsel present
at the hearing, and each employee serves as their own spokesperson.356 If either party
wishes to have legal counsel present, the counsel’s participation is limited to
advising the client; that is, legal counsel may not act as a spokesperson.357 However,
an employee may have another Kansas State University USS employee voluntarily
serve as their spokesperson.358 All hearings occur in an open session (unless the
disciplined employee requests a closed hearing), in an executive session, and
hearings that involve dismissal or demotion are transcribed.359 USS employees
found to be in violation of the University’s anti-discrimination policy can appeal the
decision to the Director of Employee Relations who makes the final decision.360
Assessing Kansas State’s peer advocate program in terms of Professor
Getman’s rubric shows that it is designed to be an effective and fair dispute
resolution procedure. First, only employees found in violation of the University’s
policies can appeal to the Director whose final decision on the matter ensure finality.
Second, the Committee is authorized to recommend suspension, demotion, or
dismissal based on its findings to the Director who makes the final determination of
the action to be taken in the matter. USS employees are subject to obey whatever
action the Director determines is appropriate. Third, in reaching a decision or
recommendation, the Panel may consider any information that may be helpful in
arriving at its conclusion, including reviewing rules and documentations. The
Panel’s report will normally become a part of the employee’s official personnel
records and may be used as guidance in subsequent employment matters. Fourth,
Kansas State’s peer advocacy system permits those who wish to seek the advice of
legal counsel and allows other USS employees to serve as representatives and
advocate for their fellow employees, thereby maximizing the efficiency of obtaining
representation for grieving workers. Fifth, the process is routinely available for all
USS employees at minimal cost. Sixth, committee members must participate in a
yearly training and are prohibited from communicating with any party prior to the
hearing to maintain neutrality. Seventh, it is currently unknown how many conflicts
proceed to formal arbitration or litigation following the peer review process. Finally,
the peer review process allows each party a full opportunity for a fair hearing by an
impartial panel and permits the parties to engage in mediation at any time prior to
the actual hearing.

355
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IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
By delegating dispute resolution to mandatory arbitration, the Supreme Court
now permits corporations to not only write the rules that will govern their
relationships with their workers and customers and design the procedures used to
interpret and apply those rules when disputes arise. This degree of institutional
power not only compromises fairness, but also alienates employees and can create
hostility in the workplace. While arbitration certainly offers several benefits—
namely that it is typically faster and cheaper than litigation—forced arbitration
agreements overwhelmingly favor employers, particularly large institutional
employers, because employers often possess considerably more bargaining power
relative to individual employees, especially prospective employees. This Part sets
forth three potential solutions aimed at restoring employees’ bargaining power and
removing the roadblocks that prevent fair and efficient workplace dispute resolution.
Section A suggests swapping forced arbitration for just-cause dismissal and
describes how doing so could help instill a better sense of fairness in the workplace.
Section B discusses how, absent formal Congressional action, employers can take
the initiative to extend Weingarten rights to their employees through specially
trained peer advocates. Finally, Section C encourages employers to utilize voluntary
arbitration, as opposed to forced arbitration, to avoid the pitfalls of superfluous
litigation without limiting an employee’s ability to seek judicial adjudication of their
statutorily protected rights.
A. The Case for Exchanging Forced Arbitration for Just-Cause Dismissal
Unless a worker has an utterly unique skill—such as athletes like Wayne
Gretzky, Albert Pujols, Serena Williams, or Megan Rapinoe—employees typically
have less bargaining power than their employers. This is especially true for
employees with fungible job duties who work for wealthy employers. In submitting
(often unwittingly) to forced arbitration, employees also typically waive their right
to a jury trial.361 Nonetheless, arbitration gives employees at least some due process,
by allowing employees to present some evidence for their position. But while
arbitration is a viable tool for dispute resolution, it can add insult to injury when
employees are unknowingly stripped of their right to have statutory claims heard by
a judge or jury. Another way of looking at this conundrum is from a rights-duties
perspective. In the United States, employees generally do not possess rights to just
cause discharge, except where Congress, a state legislature, or common law has
imposed a legal duty on an employer to refrain from discharging an employee for a
particular reason.362 When an employer offers to mediate-arbitrate all workplace
discharges, then perhaps the employer is giving some consideration to the employee.
The employee receives a right to arbitrate all disputes in exchange for surrendering
the right to litigate some disputes. Of course, it is highly unlikely that employers
361
362

See Eisenberg et al., supra note 6, at 118–19.
See supra Part II.B.
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have this type of right in mind when they speak of forced arbitration of all workplace
disputes. Instead, what they mean is the procedural right to arbitrate workplace
disputes, not the substantive right to just-cause dismissal.363
This solution might be fair if the following conditions are met. First, the waiver
must be negotiated with valid consideration on both sides.364 Valid consideration
might include granting a right to just-cause dismissal in exchange for one disputeresolution mechanism. This is the bargain that unions and employers strike just
about every time they negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement.365 If those RPs
are acting rationally, then that solution, which has stood the test of time, is likely to
be fair.
B. Peer Advocates and Weingarten Rights: A Partial Solution to Nonunion
Arbitration
There is still a problem, however, with exchanging arbitration for just-cause
dismissal. If the Galanter study is correct,366 then this trade-off is fair if employees
have some institutional representation independent of management. This is
essentially the union case. But there may be nonunion models that could work.
One model is to extend Weingarten rights to nonunion employees. In NLRB v.
J. Weingarten, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld the administrative creation of an
employee’s right to refuse to submit, without union representation, to an
investigatory interview that the employee “reasonably believe[s] . . . will result in
disciplinary action.”367 The Court held that the statutory right to union representation
“inheres in [NLRA Section] 7’s guarantee of the right of employees to act in concert
for mutual aid and protection.”368 The Court further explained that the “action of an
employee in seeking to have the assistance of his union representative at a
confrontation with his employer clearly falls within the literal wording of [Section
7’s mutual aid or protection clause].”369
363

For a discussion of rights and duties, see Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions,
supra note 28; Judicial Reasoning, supra note 28.
364
This is the idea behind settlement agreements—money in exchange for waiving
further litigation. Both sides receive finality and both sides mutually agreed to the disputes
value. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Ruth G. Blumrosen, Marco Carmignani & Thomas Daly,
Downsizing and Employee Rights, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 943, 1013–15 (1988) (discussing
this concept). See generally J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of
Civil Settlement, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2016).
365
See, e.g., Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962) (holding that a
collective-bargaining agreement’s arbitration clause is the consideration unions receive in
exchange for agreeing to waive their right to strike over arbitral subjections for the duration
of the agreement—even in the absence of a no-strike clause).
366
Galanter, supra note 248. The Galanter study concludes that RPs have advantages
over OSs in arbitration proceedings.
367
420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975).
368
Id. at 256 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157).
369
Id. at 260.
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Because the right to peer representation in disciplinary interviews is a statutory
right under the National Labor Relations Act,370 and because the National Labor
Relations Board has been entrusted by Congress to construe the Act in the first
instance,371 courts cannot simply extend Weingarten rights to nonunion workers,
absent Board adjudication or rule promulgation.372 The Board has extended and
removed Weingarten rights to nonunion employees over and over again373 in a
process known as policy oscillation.374
In any event, Weingarten rights—which, if extended (once again) to nonunion
workers, would only permit those workers to have a coworker present at a
disciplinary interview—are less effective unless the worker-witness is trained in the
mediation/arbitration process. Rather than relying on an administrative agency
known for political policy oscillation to oversee such important rights, Congress
should extend such rights directly to workers, perhaps as part of a statute that would
permit forced arbitration coupled with peer advocates or union advocates, where a
union represents the disciplined worker, in exchange for just-cause dismissal. But
whether Congress takes such action (exceedingly unlikely), private firms can act.
This is to say that the Board’s on-again, off-again policy of not mandating
Weingarten rights in the nonunion workplace does not prohibit employers from
themselves extending Weingarten rights to their employees through peer advocates.
1. Using Peer Advocates to Resolve Workplace Disputes Does Not Violate Labor
and Other Laws if Properly Implemented
At first blush, it is difficult to discern the problem with peer advocacy. The peer
review process dignifies complainants by allowing them to air their grievances in a

370

29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
The Court has repeatedly “reaffirmed that the task of defining the scope of § 7 ‘is
for the Board to perform in the first instance as it considers the wide variety of cases that
come before it,’ and, on an issue that implicates its expertise in labor relations, a reasonable
construction by the Board is entitled to considerable deference.” NLRB v. City Disposal
Systems Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829–30 (1984) (citations omitted); see also Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 568 (1978).
372
See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era
of Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199 (2010) (providing an in-depth discussion of Weingarten
rights in the union and nonunion workplace).
373
See IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004) overruling Epilepsy Found., 331
N.L.R.B. 676 (2000); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 232 (1985) overruling
Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982) (holding that the NLRA compels the
conclusion that nonunion employees have no Weingarten rights); E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 630–31 (1988) (disavowing its reasoning in Sears that the NLRA
compels that conclusion and finding that limiting Weingarten rights to union employees
“best effectuate[s] the purposes of the [NLRA]”), enforced in 876 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989).
374
See generally Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for
Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 163–64 (1985) (coining the phrase).
371
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fair hearing, and it dignifies peer advocates by magnifying their voice. Indeed, the
collective voice of peer advocates may very well be the authoritative arbiter of
workplace disputes. Moreover, employers like the process.375 So, what is all the fuss
about?
The fuss comes down to one of the historical sources of employer coercion of
workers that sparked the New Deal Congress to enact the National Labor Relations
Act.376 During the Great Depression of the 1930s, Congress initially passed the
National Industrial Recovery Act,377 which among other things banned yellow-dog
contracts378 and protected employees’ right to form unions.379 Much to the chagrin
of NIRA supporters, industrial strife tripled in the immediate aftermath of the
NIRA’s enactment.380 Employers motivated by antiunion sentiment responded, in
part, by devising non-union employee representation programs to thwart
unionization.381 These plans met fierce opposition from New Dealers who fought for
enactment of the NLRA once the Supreme Court declared the NIRA
unconstitutional.382 Armed with two years’ experience with the NIRA, Senator
Robert Wagner, the main architect of New Deal labor legislation, “and his circle
became increasingly committed to the organic solidarity of autonomous unionism
375

See EWING, supra note 2, at 307.
See generally Orly Lobel & Anne Marie Lofaso, Systems of Employee
Representation at the Enterprise: The US Report, in SYSTEMS OF EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION AT THE ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Roger Blainpain, Hiroya
Nakakubo & Takashi Araki, eds., 2012).
377
National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). In A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the Supreme Court declared
the NIRA unconstitutional under the non-delegation doctrine, a rationale that is no longer
strictly applied.
378
Yellow-dog contracts are employment contracts where employees agree not to be a
member of a labor union as a condition of employment. See Labor Wars in the U.S., PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/theminewars-labor-wars-us/ [https:
//perma.cc/D5S9-EB58] (last visited July 29, 2022). Section 7(a)(2) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act granted employees the following right: “no employee and no one
seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company
union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own
choosing.” National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 7(a)(2), 48 Stat. 195, 199
(1933).
379
See National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 7(a)(1), 48 Stat. 195,
199 (1933) (granting employees “the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.”).
380
See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1402 n.86 (1993) (citing STANLEY
VITTOZ, NEW DEAL LABOR POLICY AND THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY 138 (1987)).
381
See generally Theda Skocpol, Kenneth Finegold & Michael Goldfield, Explaining
New Deal Labor Policy, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1297 (1990).
382
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 498.
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and exclusive representation after they confronted management’s deployment of
company unionism as a weapon against workers’ collective action.”383
A debate ensued as to whether workers could truly consent to workplace
governance absent independent unions.384 According to one labor scholar, Senator
Wagner thought that genuine consent to managerial authority was unachievable sans
labor autonomy: “as a normative matter, the company union failed to provide
sufficient collective empowerment to eliminate duress and achieve workers’
democratic consent to the system of workplace governance in the large-scale
enterprise.”385 Other senators believed that worker consent could be achieved even
with company unions.386
This confluence of circumstances resulted in the enactment of Section 8(a)(2),
which makes it “an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to dominate or interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial
or other support to it.”387 Congress designed Section 8(a)(2) to ensure that employerdominated groups do not deprive employees of their right to select a representative
of their own choosing.388 Simply put, not only does U.S. federal law fail to provide
any formal legal framework for non-union employee-representation systems in the
United States, but it also puts any such system into legal doubt. In particular, the
very law that legalized labor unions made company unions unlawful.
2. Section 8(a)(2), Which Makes Company Unions Unlawful, Sometimes Captures
Other Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution
Today, the National Labor Relations Board interprets Section 8(a)(2) as
requiring the Board to engage in a two-part inquiry to determine whether an
employer has violated its duty to refrain from dominating, interfering, or unlawfully
supporting a labor organization:
The first inquiry is whether the entity involved is a “labor organization” as
defined in Section 2(5) of the Act. If not, the allegation is dismissed. If so,
the second inquiry is whether the [employer’s] conduct vis-à-vis this labor
organization constitutes domination or interference with the

383

See Barenberg, supra note 380, at 1402.
For a discussion of the history of the company union, see Wayne E. Babler, Labor
Law: Power of National Labor Relations Board to Order Disestablishment of Company
Union, 36 MICH. L. REV. 1131 (1938).
385
See Barenberg, supra note 380, at 1442. According to Professor Barenberg, Senator
Wagner offered several reasons for rejecting company unions, none of which Professor
Barenberg finds persuasive. See id. at 1443–50.
386
See id. at 1442 n. 286.
387
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
388
See Electromation, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Loc. Union No. 1049, 309
N.L.R.B. 990, 993–94 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
384

2022]

FORCED ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

1067

organization’s formation or administration, or unlawful support of the
organization.389
Simply stated, the Labor Board reviews the following two questions: First, is the
entity in question a labor organization? And second, does the employer dominate or
interfere with the labor organization formation or administration or has the employer
unlawfully supported the labor organization?390
NLRA Section 2(5) defines labor organization as “any organization of any kind,
or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.”391 Notice the broadness of the textual
language; it includes “any organization of any kind,” including any “employee
representation committee” so long as its purpose is to deal with employers over
“grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work.” Consequently, in determining whether an employee representation
committee, such as a peer review panel, is a labor organization within the meaning
of NLRA Section 2(5), the Labor Board examines the following factors: (1)
Employee participation; (2) the extent to which the entity in question addresses
“grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work”; and (3) whether the entity in question “has a purpose, in whole or in part,
of ‘dealing with’ the employer about the foregoing subject matters.”392
In Electromation, the Board clarified that
if the organization has as a purpose the representation of employees, it
meets the statutory definition of ‘employee representation committee or
plan’ under Section 2(5) and will constitute a labor organization if it also
meets the criteria of employee participation and dealing with conditions of
work or other statutory subjects.393
This is so, even if the committee “lacks a formal structure, has no elected officers,
constitution or bylaws, does not meet regularly, and does not require the payment of
initiation fees or dues.”394
Polaroid’s EC and G.E.’s peer review panels readily meet two of the three
factors for determining whether such entities are labor organizations. ECs and peer
389

Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 NLRB 1110, 1112–13 (1995).
See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 995 (“A labor organization that is the
creation of management, whose structure and function are essentially determined by
management, . . . and whose continued existence depends on the fiat of management . . . has
been dominated under Section 8(a)(2).”).
391
See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
392
See Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1113 (quoting Electromation,
Inc., 35 F.3d at 1158).
393
Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 991.
394
Id.
390
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review panels patently meet the statutory definition of employee representation
committee because they “ha[ve] as [their] purpose the representation of
employees.”395 Recall that Polaroid and G.E. devised EC and peer review panels,
respectively, keeping in mind that rank-and-file employees should have
representation.396 Though the Polaroid Employees Council peer advocate model
closely resembles a traditional union model, and though the G.E. model more closely
resembles co-determination, they both resolve grievances.
Accordingly, the question whether ECs and peer review panels are labor
organizations distills to the question whether one purpose of such organizations is
to deal with the employer about grievances. The Board has explained that dealing
with involves a “bilateral mechanism,” which “ordinarily entails a pattern or practice
in which a group of employees, over time, makes proposals to management,
management responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or deed,
and compromise is not required.”397 For example, in Simmons Industries, Inc., the
Board found that a safety committee’s conduct constituted “dealing with” because
its members’ proposals “were considered and accepted or rejected by
management.”398
In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon, the Labor Board, with Supreme Court approval,
further clarified its construction of the term “dealing with,” explaining that the term
is not synonymous with the term collective bargaining but is, in fact, broader than
that term.399 The Board further elaborated on this point in Electromation: “an
organization whose purpose is limited to performing essentially a managerial or
adjudicative function is not a labor organization under Section 2(5). In those
circumstances, it is irrelevant if the impetus behind the organization’s creation
emanates from the employer.”400
In another case, the Board explained that it would not find dealing, and
therefore would not find that the peer review panel is a labor organization, where a
company “flatly delegate[s] [managerial functions] to employees.”401 Indeed, the
Board reasoned that:
While the employer could withdraw the powers delegated to employees to
perform these functions on its behalf, the withdrawal of authority would
be wholly unilateral on its part just as was [the employer’s] original
delegation. There was no dealing between employer and employee (or
employee group) involved in these matters. These functions were just

395

Id. at 994.
Id.
397
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993).
398
321 N.L.R.B. 228, 254 (1996).
399
See 360 U.S. 203, 211–14 (1959) (concerning a committee composed entirely of
employees, without discussing managers).
400
Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 994.
401
General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1232–33 (1977).
396
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other assignments of job duties, albeit duties not normally granted to rankand-file personnel.402
Under these cases, employers would struggle with designing peer review
systems that do not meet the definition of a “labor organization.” To be sure, peer
review panels typically do not engage in collective bargaining; but that would not
exclude them from the statutory definition of labor organization anyway because
“dealing with” encompasses activity other than bargaining. The important inquiry
here is two-fold: (1) what is the committee’s or panel’s composition? and (2) are
ECs or peer review panels tailored to engage in management functions? Peer
advocates are, by definition, nonsupervisory. Moreover, they engage not only in
grievance adjustment but also in bilateral dealings with respect to Employee Stock
Ownership Plan (ESOP) funds, disciplinary proceedings, medical benefits, and time
off for family and medical reasons.403 While adjusting grievances is quintessentially
a supervisory function,404 peer advocates do not become supervisory by playing that
role because they are adjusting grievances not in the interest of the employer but in
the interest of the grievant.405
By contrast, peer panels have both supervisory and nonsupervisory employees.
Accordingly, the question of domination is going to become important in controlling
positions. To be sure, employers interested in peer review could avoid Section
8(a)(2) liability altogether by flatly delegating authority to a peer review panel
purely composed of peer advocates, like EC panels, with no management
representatives. Once management places management representatives on a peer
review panel, there is room for management to persuade—and therefore space to
deal with—the peer advocates. And once present, management representatives
would be in a position to coerce employee representatives. Because management is
unlikely to create a system with no management oversight, the question of
domination presents a critical issue.
Even if an employee representation committee or other entity can be classified
as a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5),406 the employer does not
violate Section 8(a)(2) unless it “dominat[es],” “interfere[s] with,” or unlawfully
supports that organization.407 In determining whether peer review panels are labor

402

Id. at 1235.
Cf. supra notes 389–394 and accompanying text. See also Polaroid Corp., 329
N.L.R.B. 424, 436 (1999) (finding Section 8(a)(2) violation).
404
See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (defining supervisors as those who, among other things,
“adjust . . . grievances” “in the interest of the employer” using “independent judgment”).
405
See Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 511 U.S. 571, 579 (1994)
(observing that the statutory language, “in the interest of the employer,” which helps to
define supervisor, “ensures, for example, that union stewards who adjust”).
406
29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
407
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it”).
403
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organizations that are unlawfully dominated, the Board will focus on the concept of
“domination.”408
The Board in Electromation, for example, attempted to shed light on the
question whether an employer unlawfully dominates or interferes with the formation
or administration of an employee representation committee:
A labor organization that is the creation of management, whose structure
and function are essentially determined by management . . . and whose
continued existence depends on the fiat of management, is one whose
formation or administration has been dominated under Section 8(a)(2). In
such an instance, actual domination has been established by virtue of the
employer’s specific acts of creating the organization itself and determining
its structure and function. However, when the formulation and structure of
the organization is determined by employees, domination is not
established, even if the employer has the potential ability to influence the
structure or effectiveness of the organization. . . . Thus, the Board’s cases
following Cabot Carbon reflect the view that when the impetus behind the
formation of an organization of employees emanates from an employer
and the organization has no effective existence independent of the
employer’s active involvement, a finding of domination is appropriate if
the purpose of the organization is to deal with the employer concerning
conditions of employment.409
The Board’s formulation of what constitutes domination is hardly a model for
clarity, but it does give managers the message that designing peer review programs
constitutes an overt act of actual dominance. One way that employers interested in
peer review might get around the domination problem is to create peer review panels
solely composed of nonsupervisory personnel, but whose decisions are overseen by
a management panel. By contrast, the NLRB or reviewing court would not find
dominance, where such programs are self-sustaining regardless of employer
participation. This is the case with the EC model of peer advocates, where
nonsupervisory employees elected other nonsupervisory employees, entirely
independent of management.
3. Using Labor Law to Protect Peer Advocates from Retaliation
The question comes to mind of whether management could retaliate against
peer advocates for taking a position that it views as contrary to company policy.
Whether the National Labor Relations Act protects an employee rep from such

408

Id.
See Electromation, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Loc. Union No. 1049, 309
N.L.R.B. 990, 993–94 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
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retaliation turns on the question whether advocacy is protected concerted activity
under Section 7.410
Section 7 grants employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, . . . .”411 Section 8(a)(1)
prohibits an employer from discharging an employee that is engaged in concerted
activity that is protected under Section 7.412 The Board, with court approval, has held
that “[i]n general, to find an employee’s activity to be ‘concerted,’ we shall require
that it be engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by
and on behalf of the employee himself.”413 Section 7 presumptively protects
employees engaged in concerted activity unless that activity somehow loses its
protection where, for example, the conduct violates another federal statute,414
involves violence or protect destruction,415 is in breach of a no-strike clause,416 or is
otherwise indefensible because it involves product disparagement or involves
communications that are exceedingly “disloyal, reckless or maliciously untrue.”417
Applying these principles, the Board could reasonably conclude that Section 7
protects the conduct of EC reps in their service as peer advocates. This conduct
would be concerted so long as it is “engaged in with or on the authority of other
employees,” who have elected these employees to serve as peer advocates.418 Nor,
in the abstract, is there any reason to believe that acts of peer advocacy could lose
their protection.419 To be sure, an employer could discharge a peer advocate for
threatening to harm a manager who refused to rule in favor of an employee. But
there is nothing inherent in the pure act of advocacy to believe that it would lose its
protection. In short, nonunion peer advocates would have an NLRA claim against
any company that fires them for engaging in their advocacy roles.
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29 U.S.C. § 157.
Id.
412
Id. § 158(a)(1).
413
Meyers Indus. Inc. v. Prill, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill
v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), reaffirmed, 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), enforced sub
nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 38–49 (1942) (holding that Section 7
does not protect seafarers engaged in a strike aboard a ship away from its home port because
such conduct constituted a mutiny in violation of federal law).
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See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (holding that
Section 7 does not protect right to strike accompanied by illegal seizure of buildings and acts
of force and violence).
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See NLRB v. Local U. No. 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464, 344 (1953).
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4. Reducing the Risk of Peer Advocates Engaged in the Unauthorized Practice of
Law
The use of nonlawyer peer advocates raises the question of whether these
employee reps would be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. There is a lowlevel risk that peer advocates would be viewed as engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law, although further research should be done regarding the law of each
state.
Model Rule 5.5 regulates the unauthorized practice of law and multijurisdictional law practice by focusing on the conduct of lawyers admitted to practice
in state A and not admitted to practice in state B but engaging in legal practice in
state B.420 It also focuses on the conduct of nonlawyers who engage in legal-like
practice (paralegals, for example), but who are supervised by a lawyer.421 The failure
to properly supervise the nonlawyer may result in state sanction of the supervising
lawyer.422 This leaves us with two questions. First, do states have authority to
regulate the nonlawyers themselves? In general, states do have such authority and a
state court of last resort could issue a cease-and-desist order against nonlawyers
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.423 Second, what constitutes the practice
of law and, as a corollary, is peer advocacy legal practice? That question is more
difficult to answer succinctly because each state has its own definition of legal
practice that is typically exclusively within the province of that state’s court of last
resort.424 That definition, regardless of jurisdiction, will always include

420

See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
See id. r. 5.3.
422
See, e.g., Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Phillips, 155 A.3d 476, 480–86, 490–91 (Md.
2017) (lawyer disciplined for establishing law firm with nonlawyer son and ratifying son’s
representations and conduct); In re Hrones, 933 N.E.2d 622, 625–27, 631–32 (Mass. 2010)
(lawyer disciplined for allowing unlicensed law school graduate to handle employment
discrimination cases with no supervision, sign lawyer’s name on appearance forms and
administrative complaints, and share fees); In re Guirard, 11 So. 3d 1017, 1029–30 (La.
2009) (attorneys disbarred for failing to supervise nonlawyers who advised clients on
viability of legal claims and negotiated claims); Miss. Bar v. Thompson, 5 So. 3d 330, 337–
38 (Miss. 2008) (lawyer disciplined for “giving [paralegal] the position and resources
necessary to practice law, and then failing to adequately supervise him”).
423
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (regulating
nonlawyers); but see id. r. 5.3 cmt. 2 (stating that nonlawyers “are not subject to professional
discipline”).
424
See, e.g., In re Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d 85, 88, 91 (R.I. 2012); see also
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1463 (explaining that “the Model Code
does not define unauthorized practice,” which “is a question of law and not a question of
ethics.” (citing ABA Comm. on Pro. Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 198 (1939); ABA
Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Formal Op. 316 (1967); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp.,
Informal Op. 1264 (1973); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1272 (1973))).
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representation before judicial tribunals.425 Therefore, it makes sense to consider
whether representation before quasi-judicial tribunals, such as an arbitrator or a
management decision maker in a grievance proceeding, is sufficiently like
representation before a court to constitute the practice of law.
Whatever the definition of legal practice, it is unlikely that the duties of peer
advocates fall within that definition. In In re Town of Little Compton,426 the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island was called upon to determine whether a non-lawyer employee
representing a union during a labor arbitration was engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law. After reviewing the law in Ohio and California as well as U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the nature of arbitration, the court held that the
employee was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.427 The court based
its decision on the nature of arbitration as compared with judicial proceedings.428
Indeed, the court noted that the main incentives for using arbitration are to provide
parties with “expeditious, inexpensive, and informal” resolution of workplace
conflict.429 The court observed:
[I]n contrast to other types of disputes, labor disputes are unique in that
the “law of the shop” rather than strict adherence to legal principles
typically controls. Union representatives are often particularly qualified to
represent a union based on their familiarity with the multilevel grievance
process, their knowledge of the operating procedures, equipment, and
training, and their understanding of the formation and evolution of the
applicable collective-bargaining agreement. This is not to say that licensed
attorneys do not have, or are not able to acquire, such knowledge of, or
familiarity with, these matters, but simply to acknowledge why union
employees often represent unions in arbitrations.430
The court was also concerned with over-formalizing arbitration proceedings, which
would result in delay and increased costs for the parties, contrary to ADR
principles.431
Other states have more expressly excluded participation in resolving labor
disputes from the definition of legal practice. For example, Connecticut expressly
excludes participation in labor arbitration proceedings as coming within the practice

425

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1463 (1981) (explaining since
what constitutes the practice of law is a question of law, “state laws, court rules, and court
decisions should be consulted to determine what is considered unauthorized practice of law
in each jurisdiction where the firm is to perform services”).
426
In re Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d 85 (R.I. 2012).
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Id. at 90–91.
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Id. at 92–95.
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Id. at 93.
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of law.432 Other states, such as Illinois, have expressly excluded union representation
of employees at certain administrative hearings from the definition of the practice
of law.433 Ohio allows non-attorney union representatives to represent public
employees in termination proceedings.434
Courts in these jurisdictions, applying the reasoning of these cases to the
context of peer advocates, are unlikely to find peer representation in internal
grievance proceedings to constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Indeed, the
work of Polaroid’s EC before management is even more informal than arbitration,
which itself one court distinguished from judicial proceedings. While a state statute
expressly excluding such conduct would clearly authorize peer advocacy, such a
statute does not seem necessary considering non-lawyer union representation during
grievances. Nevertheless, we must proceed with caution as we tread down this road
because several jurisdictions have suggested that lawyers, admitted to practice in
state A, who wish to participate in an arbitration in state B, must seek permission to
participate in state B’s arbitration proceedings or risk running afoul of unauthorized
practice of law rules.435
To eliminate the unauthorized-practice-of-law risk, a company could have inhouse counsel supervise peer advocates. That solution seems undesirable, however,
from both management’s and labor’s point of view. From management’s vantage
point, not only does supervision increase the cost of the internal system, but it also
raises potential conflict-of-interest claims.436 After all, in-house counsel represents
management, whose position is, by definition, adverse to that of the grievant.
Similarly, the employee rep would likely sense that conflict. Perhaps a way around
this conflict would be for the company to hire an ombudsman, who would be a
practicing lawyer and would supervise peer advocates. This solution might be
expensive and possibly unnecessary, at least in states that have expressly excluded
participation before informal tribunals from the definition of legal practice. But if
cost-effective, this might be the legally safest route, shy of state legislation expressly
permitting non-lawyer peer advocates.

432

See Bysiewicz v. DiNardo, 2010 WL 1838604, *35 (Conn. Super. 2010) (citing
Practice Book 1998, § 2-44A(b)), overruled on other grounds by Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 298
Conn. 748, 6 A.3d 726 (Conn. 2010).
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See Grafner v. Dep’t Emp. Sec., 393 Ill.App.3d 791, 914 N.E.2d 520 (Ill. App. 1
Dist. 2009) (state statute permitting unions to represent employees at unemployment
compensation hearings).
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See Williams v. Cincinnati, 2009 WL 1152134 (Oh. App. 1 Dist. 2009) (upholding
decision to discharge and holding that non-attorney union representative to represent public
employee in termination proceedings did not taint proceedings).
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See, e.g., Tammy N. Giroux & Jeremy Medeiros, Proceeding with Caution: The
Unauthorized Practice of Law presented at Twenty-first Annual Northeast Surety and
Fidelity Claims Conference (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.slideshare.net/mcarruthers/quot
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5. Actionable Conduct Under Goodman v. Lukens
In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Company, the Supreme Court held that a union’s
refusal to file race discrimination grievances on behalf of its Black members
constituted unlawful discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. There,
the Court upheld a lower court’s finding that a union violated Title VII by “failing
to challenge discriminatory discharges of probationary employees; failure and
refusal to assert racial discrimination as a ground for grievances; and toleration and
tacit encouragement of racial harassment.”437 Later courts interpreting Goodman v.
Lukens have sought to find a pattern of ignoring race-related grievances before
holding a union liable under Title VII.438
The question whether Goodman v. Lukens would apply to peer advocates
depends on the answer to the following two questions. Are peer advocates labor
organizations for purposes of Title VII? If so, can the disgruntled grievant show that
the peer advocates had a policy of ignoring race-related grievances?
The Court in Jones v. American Postal Workers Union439 provides one of the
most comprehensive and well-reasoned analyses of the definition of “labor
organization” within the meaning of Title VII. There, the court observed that it owed
Chevron deference440 to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
construction of the statutory term “labor organization” for purposes of Title VII.441
The question here is whether the EEOC could reasonably interpret Title VII’s
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482 U.S. 656, 664–65 (1987), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5114.
438
See Wesley v. Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local 745, 660 F.3d 211,
214–15 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that union member failed to prove that union violated
Section 1981 because he could not prove that his complaints about the union were held by
any other member or that the union had “adopted a practice of ignoring race-related
grievances of members”); Faragalla v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 411 F. App’x 140, 159–60
(10th Cir. 2011) (holding that Goodman did not support former union member’s racial
discrimination against her union because she had failed to prove that the union had a “policy
or practice of declining to assert discrimination claims”).
439
192 F.3d 417 (4th Cir.1999). Although Jones is a disability discrimination case
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the court noted that the ADA borrows the
definition of “labor organization” from Title VII. The court proceeded to analyze Title VII’s
definition of that statutory term. The fact that Jones is a public-sector case is also irrelevant
here. In Jones, the court was asked to determine whether Title VII covers public-sector
unions. There is no question that Title VII covers private-sector unions. Id.
440
Chevron deference is a principle of administrative law and statutory construction,
which holds that, to the extent that a statute is ambiguous or silent on an issue, courts must
defer to an administrative agency’s reasonable and permissible construction of those statutes
that Congress charged that agency with administering. For example, the courts must defer to
the NLRB’s reasonable construction of the NLRA but need not give any deference to the
NLRB’s construction of immigration laws. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1983).
441
Jones, 192 F.3d at 427.
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definition of labor organization as encompassing peer advocates. Title VII defines
labor organization as follows:
The term “labor organization” means a labor organization engaged in an
industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such an organization, and
includes any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee
representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part,
of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any
conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so
engaged which is subordinate to a national or international labor
organization.442
The EEOC, which is entitled to judicial deference in its interpretation of the
statutory term, labor organization, has explained that,
A labor organization is covered under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA
if it meets one of the following two tests:
1. It represents the employees of an employer; and
It has 15 or more members (25 or more under the ADEA) or
maintains a hiring hall which procures employees for at least
one covered employer
or
2. It is engaged in an industry affecting commerce.443
Given the breadth of the EEOC’s definition of labor organization, it seems highly
likely that the EEOC and reviewing court would find peer advocates to be labor
organizations so long as the firm, as an employer, is covered by Title VII. The
question then becomes whether peer advocates would be liable for race
discrimination under Goodman v. Lukens. That inquiry would depend on the factual
context of the case. In Polaroid’s case, where EC reps were known to file all
grievances, there would not have been any Goodman v. Lukens liability. Moreover,
only the company—not the EC—could be liable in Title VII for decisions to take
grievances to arbitration to the extent that those decisions were within
management’s unilateral control, as was the case at Polaroid.
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C. Voluntary Arbitration: The Case for Preserving Judicial Remedies
Eliminating forced arbitration as a condition of employment does not preclude
the option of voluntary arbitration as a means of resolving a dispute. There remains
the policy question of whether we want employees to waive jury trials in some
wrongful discharge cases. Perhaps there are some reasons for employer
(mis)conduct that we, as a democratic people, believe are so fundamentally bad that
preserving litigation as an option is vital. Or perhaps employees and employers wish
to preserve their forum choice. One solution to these problems is to preserve judicial
remedies where judicial remedies are provided by statute. Polaroid did this in its
arbitration program, which mandated arbitration in cases where workers were
allegedly in violation of company rules or policies but preserved judicial remedies
in statutory cases.444 This policy is most effective from the employee’s point of view
where trained peer advocates are employed.
Creating a system of voluntary arbitration, coupled with the exhaustion of
internal administrative remedies before a worker could seek court review, could cut
down on the number of complaints that are filed in court. A well-developed
mediation-grievance-arbitration internal dispute resolution with well-developed and
direct lines of communication could allow managers and workers to create a
productive, high-trust culture. Such a culture contrasts with shock discharges, where
an employer discharges an employee who has no notice that something is wrong.
Shock discharges eliminate the possibility of resolving not just the problem
underlying that employee’s grievance, but also the possibility of resolving a more
systemic problem that affects a much larger population.445
The most direct way to address mandatory arbitration would be for Congress
to amend the Federal Arbitration Act to exempt employment arbitration, or to
provide more protection for employee rights in arbitration. For example, with the
rise of the #MeToo movement propelling the issue of sexual harassment into the
national spotlight, both scholars and lawmakers have begun to reassess forced
arbitration agreements, taking careful notice of their deficiencies and ills when it
comes to sexual harassment.446 Arbitration’s confidential process not only shields
abusers from accountability by allowing both companies and executives to avoid
public scrutiny and embarrassment, but it also prevents victims from learning about
other occurrences of misconduct and banding together to take on workplace
444

See generally EWING, supra note 2, at 299–308.
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injustice. Several states, including New York, Maryland, Washington, and Vermont,
have enacted legislation banning mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims
with the federal government following suit earlier this year.447
On March 3, 2022, President Biden signed into law the Ending Forced
Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act, which amends the FAA
and effectively invalidates pre-dispute arbitration agreements and class action
waivers in sexual harassment and assault cases brought by workers.448 Significantly,
the Act gives courts, not arbitrators, the power to determine whether the Act
applies.449 Early support from Senator Lindsey Graham, the topmost Republican on
the Judiciary Committee, helped the bill pick up bipartisan support.450 Congressional
lawmakers worked on the bill with former Fox News anchor Gretchen Carlson who
sued then-Fox News Chairman and CEO Roger Ailes for sexual harassment.451
Carlson claims she had no idea that her employment contract with the network
mandated that sexual harassment claims be handled in private arbitration until she
met with her lawyers to discuss suing Ailes.452 Carlson ultimately sued the former
CEO personally under New York civil rights law, prompting several more women
to come out with similar allegations against Ailes.453
While the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment
Act limits pre-dispute arbitration agreements with respect to sexual harassment and
assault, the law does not apply retroactively to existing disputes.454 Employers are
permitted to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements for claims of sexual
harassment and assault that arose before March 3, 2022.455 The Act also leaves
mandatory arbitration agreements that compel arbitration of other employmentrelated claims unaffected.456 It is also important to note that the language of the Act
prohibits the enforcement of arbitration clauses for sexual harassment and assault
“cases” rather than “claims.”457 So, what happens in lawsuits containing multiple
447
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claims? Specifically, what happens in a case involving but not limited to sexual
harassment and/or assault? Courts will have to sort out whether non-covered claims
subject to mandatory arbitration can be severed from any sexual harassment or
assault claims and sent to arbitration.
While the passage of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and
Sexual Harassment Act is encouraging, as explained above, forced arbitration is not
solely a problem for sexual harassment victims. A ban on forced arbitration in the
realm of sexual harassment is only a fragment of the solution needed to rehabilitate
workplace grievance procedures and create a fair and amiable workplace
environment. Arbitration, when knowingly and voluntarily agreed to, can be an
adequate and favorable alternative to formal litigation. However, most present-day
mandatory arbitration agreements strip employees of their rights and often lead to
costly and time-consuming quasi-judicial legal action arbitration is meant to prevent.
Absent further Congressional safeguards protecting employees’ choice to pursue
litigation, peer-centric internal dispute-resolution procedures remain the most
effective way to both preserve fairness and justice for employees and reduce costs
and avoid highly publicized dispute for employers.
CONCLUSION
We are currently entering an era where compelled arbitration is becoming the
norm in resolving workplace disputes. While compelled arbitration might be more
efficient than litigation, there are several drawbacks. Forced arbitration facilitates
and perpetuates discriminatory practices in the workplace by allowing employers to
escape judicial and public scrutiny and, oftentimes, accountability. As Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg recognized in her dissent in Epic Systems, “[e]mployees’ rights to
band together to meet their employers’ superior strength would be worth precious
little if employers could condition employment on workers signing away those
rights.”458 Preceding arbitration with an internal grievance system that utilizes peer
advocates seems to have the advantage of (1) avoiding even the cost of arbitration;
and (2) maintaining morale. As we begin to study ways of improving access to
justice in a manner that is cost-effective, peer advocacy should receive thoughtful
consideration.
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